Michigan Journal of International Law
Volume 28

Issue 2

2007

Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring
Refugees to Seek Protection in Another State
Michelle Foster
University of Melbourne Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, Immigration Law Commons, International Law Commons,
and the Transnational Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michelle Foster, Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring Refugees to Seek Protection in
Another State, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 223 (2007).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol28/iss2/1

This Colloquium is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal
of International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

PROTECTION ELSEWHERE:
THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REQUIRING

REFUGEES TO SEEK PROTECTION
IN ANOTHER STATE
Michelle Foster*

I. IN TRODU CTION .........................................................................
II.
III.

223

THE LEGITIMACY OF PROTECTION
ELSEW HERE PRACTICES ............................................................
230
IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES MAY A STATE
IMPLEMENT A PROTECTION ELSEWHERE POLICY? ....... . . . . .. . . . . .. 237

A. To Whom May a State TransferRefugees
Under a Protection Elsewhere Scheme? ........................... 237
B. De Jure and De Facto Compliance with
the Refugee Convention ..................................................... 238
IV.

RESPECT FOR REFUGEE RIGHTS: NON-REFOULEMENT ............

244

A. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention ................................
B. TerritorialScope of Article 33 ...........................................
C. The Scope of State Responsibility Pursuant
to A rticle 33 .......................................................................
V. RESPECT FOR REFUGEE RIGHTS BEYOND ARTICLE 33 .............
A . Refugee Convention...........................................................
B. Respect for Other International
Human Rights Obligations................................................
V I. SAFEGU ARDS ............................................................................
A. The Need for an EmpiricalAssessment and
the Ability to Challenge a Decision to Transfer ................
B. The Need for Transfer to be Undertaken
Pursuantto a Written Agreement ......................................
C. Obligationto Undertake Post-TransferMonitoring..........
V II. CONCLU SION ............................................................................

244
250
26 1
263
267
275
278
278
283
284
285

I. INTRODUCTION

In the past few decades, many state parties to the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention)' have
*

Senior Lecturer and Director, Research Programme in International Refugee Law,

Institute for International Law and the Humanities, University of Melbourne Law School. I
would like to thank Anna Hood, Anne Kallies, and Eve Lester of Melbourne Law School for
very helpful research assistance for this Article. I am also grateful to James Hathaway and all
participants in the Fourth Colloquium on Challenges in International Refugee Law for very
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. The research for this project was funded
by a University of Melbourne Collaborative Grant.
1.
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 2545 (1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; supplemented by
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responded to perceived problems with the international regime for
refugee protection by adopting measures designed to discourage persons
from seeking protection in the developed North. The strategies, though
diverse, are all premised on the supposition that certain categories of
refugees should not be afforded the opportunity to obtain protection in
the territory of the state in which they have sought, or intend to seek,
such protection. One of the most discussed and well documented of
these measures is the practice of sending a refugee applicant who has
reached the territory of a state party to a third country. Under this
practice, the state party neither allows the refugee to stay nor returns her
to the country of origin; rather, the refugee is transferred to a third
country in which it is said she will find protection. The third country is
often identified as either the "country of first asylum" (implying that the
refugee has already found protection in that country) or a "safe third
country" (implying that the refugee could seek protection in that
country). Some states apply these concepts to a situation where a person
has only transited briefly through the relevant third state.2 More recent
practices and proposals have suggested that these concepts may even
permit the transfer of a refugee to a country to which the refugee has
never been.'
It might be possible for states to engage in such policies in order to
ensure the fair and equitable allocation of protection responsibilities
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 8791 [hereinafter
Refugee Protocol].
2.
The most obvious example of this is the Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the
European Communities (the Dublin Convention), opened for signature June 15, 1990, 30
I.L.M. 425 (1991). This has been replaced by the "Dublin II Regulation" (Council Regulation
(EC) No. 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Asylum Application Lodged in One
of the Member States by a Third-Country National, 2003 O.J. (L 50) 1, 10 [hereinafter Dublin
II Regulation]).
3.
A well-known example of this is Australia's "Pacific Solution," developed in the
wake of the Tampa controversy in 2001. See Penelope Mathew, Australian Refugee Law in the
Wake of the Tampa, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 661 (2002); Savitri Taylor, Protection Elsewhere/Nowhere, 18 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 283 (2006); and Susan Kneebone, The Pacific Plan:
The Provision of 'Effective Protection'?, 18 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 696 (2006). The United
Kingdom put forward a similar proposal in 2003 whereby asylum seekers arriving in the
United Kingdom would be transferred to a transit processing center outside the European

Union. For a description and analysis of this proposal, see

AMNESTY INT'L, UNLAWFUL AND

UNWORKABLE-AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S VIEWS ON PROPOSALS FOR EXTRA-TERRITORIAL
OF ASYLUM CLAIMS
(2003), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/
index/engior610042003. See also Gregor Noll, Visions of the Exceptional: Legal and Theoretical Issues Raised by Transit Processing Centres and Protection Zones, 5 EUR. J.
MIGRATION & L. 303 (2003). For the most radical of these proposals to date, see Alexander
Betts, The Political Economy of Extra-TerritorialProcessing: Separating "Purchaser"from
"Provider" in Asylum Policy (UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No.
91, 2003).
PROCESSING
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among states, thus potentially benefiting refugees.4 However, the policies
adopted and proposed to date are largely understood as an attempt to
minimize state obligations to refugees. This risks circumventing the
rights regime set out in the Refugee Convention and other international
human rights instruments.5 For example, in the case of Australia's unilateral transfer of refugees to Nauru under the "Pacific Solution," Susan
Kneebone notes that "one objective of the Pacific Strategy was to deny
the asylum seekers access to Australia's legal system, which includes the
right to independent merits review and rights of judicial review.", 6 Additionally, transfer of a refugee to a third state often removes her chance of
obtaining refugee status. For example, since recognition practices vary
widely even within the "unified" system of the European Union, the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) notes that a

4.
For example, in its critique of the Dublin II Regulation, the European Council on
Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) proposes an alternative system for allocating responsibility
based on two criteria: "l) the Member State where the asylum seeker has a family member is
responsible, provided he or she agrees with a transfer to that state; or 2) the Member State
where the asylum request was first lodged is responsible, unless there are compelling humanitarian considerations to preclude this." Further, ECRE proposes that this alternative system
"should contain mechanisms to share responsibility for supporting those Member States that

receive disproportionately high numbers of asylum seekers." ECRE, REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE DUBLIN II REGULATION IN EUROPE 171 (2006) [hereinafter ECRE DUBLIN
II], available at http://www.ecre.org/resources/research.paperslist. Indeed, even under existing criteria, the Dublin II Regulation entitles a refugee in one state to be reunited with family
members in another state-an example of a situation in which a transfer may benefit refugees.
Id. at 165. In that respect, ECRE calls for attention to be given to "how to better enable individuals to themselves invoke the application of the Dublin II Regulation where another state is
responsible under the hierarchy of criteria under the Regulation but the host state is failing to
request or initiate transfer." Id.
5.
This is highlighted by the fact that states do not usually measure the "success" of
these schemes in terms of protection outcomes for refugees, but rather by reference to falling
refugee numbers in their own state, i.e., their deterrent value. This has particularly been the
case in Australia. In a recent article, the Assistant High Commissioner for Protection of the
UNHCR has noted that the notion of effective protection is
increasingly being employed, at least in this context [i.e., arguments over whether a
particular state is responsible for specific refugees], as a means to limit a particular
State's responsibilities towards specific asylum seekers or refugees ....There is a
real danger in allowing the debate about who is responsible for an asylum seeker to
determine the meaning of this term "effective protection." There is clearly an interest on the part of some to define the notion down to a lower rather than higher
common denominator, so as to legitimate or facilitate the implementation of restrictive asylum policies.
Erika Feller, Asylum, Migration and Refugee Protection: Realities, Myths and the Promise of
Things to Come, 18 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 510, 528 (2006).
6.
Kneebone, supra note 3, at 715.
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Chechen refugee returned from Austria to Slovakia will see her chances
of being recognized as a refugee fall from over eighty percent to zero.7
These practices have been controversial precisely because they are
understood as an attempt to circumvent state obligations towards refugees. This is particularly so because the idea of requiring a refugee to
seek protection elsewhere is not explicitly anchored in the text of the
Refugee Convention! Rather, these policies are founded on an implicit
authorization-a form of reasoning based on the fact that the Refugee
Convention does not provide a positive right to be granted asylum. 9 The
key protection in the Refugee Convention is non-refoulement (Article
33), the obligation on states not to return a refugee to a place in which he
will face the risk of being persecuted.' ° States reason that, as long as they
do not violate this prohibition, they are not required to provide protection to refugees who reach their territory, but rather they are free to send
refugees to other states, possibly even states that are not parties to the
Refugee Convention.
In light of the absence of explicit authority in the Convention, a key
initial question is whether protection elsewhere practices are permitted
under international law. A second key question is whether, assuming that
some kind of transfer is permitted, any constraints operate on states in
choosing to send a refugee to another country. It is often suggested that
such transfers are permitted provided that a refugee will enjoy "effective
protection" in the third country;" however, there is little agreement on
7.
U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, 2005 GLOBAL REFUGEE TRENDS (2006), available at http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/. Other consequences sometimes follow from
subjection to a protection elsewhere policy. For example, the UNHCR points out that in some
States governed by the Dublin regime, "conditions of reception and benefits differ for asylumseekers in the Dublin II procedure and those in the regular procedure," including access to
education and financial assistance. U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, THE DUBLIN II REGULATION: A UNHCR DISCUSSION PAPER 51 (2006) [hereinafter UNHCR DUBLIN II].
8.
As Symes and Jorro note, the "safe third country" concept is "the largely invented
internationally accepted concept of normally applying for asylum in the first safe country of
arrival." MARK SYMES & PETER JORRO, ASYLUM LAW AND PRACTICE 513 (2003).
9.
There is no "right to asylum" in the Refugee Convention or in international law
more generally. Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which is not binding in any event) provides only that "everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A(II), art. 14, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
10.
Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 33.
11.
See e.g., U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Lisbon Expert Roundtable, Dec. 9-10,
2002, Lisbon, Port., Summary Conclusions on the Concept of "Effective Protection" in the
Context of Secondary Movements of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers (Feb. 2003), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3e5f323d7.pdf [hereinafter Lisbon Conclusions].
See also Council Directive 2004/83/EC, art. 27(1), 2004 O.J. (L 304) (EC). This directive sets
out the conditions of safety for the application of the safe third country concept:
[Wihere life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion; (b) where the principle
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the precise parameters of that concept.'2 In particular, the question of
which, if any, human rights protections need to be present in another
country before it may be considered to provide effective protection remains unresolved.
In response to the increasing popularity of deflection and responsibility-sharing schemes (both adopted and proposed), a number of
attempts have been made to outline the factors that should be taken into
account in assessing whether to send refugees to third states. Such guidelines have sometimes been developed by reference to both the Refugee
Convention and other international human rights instruments. One striking feature, however, is that few analyses have questioned the legal basis
for the practices, assuming instead that, in line with the view of state
parties to the Refugee Convention, they are permitted under international

of non-refoulement is respected in accordance with the Refugee Convention; (c)
where the prohibition on removal in breach of the fight to freedom from torture and
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law is respected
and (d) if the possibility exists to request refugee status, and if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Refugee Convention.
Id. See also European Comm'n, Commc'n to the Council & European Parliament, Towards
more accessible, equitable and managed systems, at 5, COM (2003) 315 final (June 3, 2003);
European Comm'n, Commc'n to the Council & European Parliament, On the managed entry
in the EU of persons in need of internationalprotection and the enhancement of the protection
capacity of the regions of origin--"Improving access to DurableSolutions," at 3, COM (2004)
410 final (June 4, 2004). The Director of Protection at the UNHCR has also provided guidance as to the meaning of this term. For example, in September 2003, at the fifty-fourth
meeting of the Executive Committee (ExCom), the Director, Erika Feller, emphasized that,
"[i]n UNHCR's view, [effective protection] has to find its base in respect for refugee and human fights law, and it has to be practiced with its humanitarian objectives to the fore, in a
manner consistent as much with the spirit as the letter of the refugee protection regime." On
October 20, 2004, at the fifty-fifth ExCom meeting, Feller provided more specific guidance as
to the meaning of the concept. In terms of state practice, the term "effective protection" is
most often employed in the Australian jurisprudence, but has also been employed in other
contexts. For example, Cathryn Costello cites a report by the House of Lords Select Committee which noted that while the Refugee Convention does not prohibit the transfer of
responsibility for the processing of asylum claims in third countries, such transfer must not
take place unless the third country offers "effective protection." Cathryn Costello, The Asylum
Procedures Directive and the Proliferationof Safe Third Country Practices:Deterrence, Deflection and the Dismantling of International Protection?,7 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 35, 57

(2005).
Stephen Legomsky notes the many contexts in which the phrase has been employed
12.
but observes that "no comprehensive definition has been advanced." Stephen H. Legomsky,
Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The
Meaning of Effective Protection, 15 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 567, 573 (2003). Similarly, Costello
argues that "effective protection has the potential of evolving into a meaningful constraint on
the use and abuse of FCA [first country of arrival] (and indeed STC [safe third country]) techniques" while acknowledging that "[t]he process whereby it is imbued with meaning is
ongoing." Costello, supra note 11, at 59.
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law.' 3 In addition, even those studies or guidelines that have formulated a
list of constraints on state action have generally not explored the applicability of provisions beyond Article 33's principle of non-refoulement.
Such guidelines therefore tend to overlook the potential for the rights
regime set out in the Refugee Convention to operate as a constraint on
state behavior. 4 Thus, although protection elsewhere practices and policies are now well entrenched in many states, surprisingly little clarity or
consensus exists regarding their legality under international law.
In light of this lacuna in respect of such an important issue, the question of states' rights to engage in protection elsewhere practices was
identified as the focus of the Fourth Colloquium on Challenges in International Refugee Law and the resulting Michigan Guidelines. This
Article sets out the analysis of state responsibility that forms the basis
for the Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere, published in this
issue."
States have adopted a wide range of deflection practices and policies, but only a subset of these is the subject of this Article. The
Michigan Guidelines' concept of protection elsewhere refers to a situation in which a state or agency acts on the basis that the protection needs
of a refugee should be considered or addressed somewhere other than in
the territory of the state where the refugee has sought, or intends to seek,
protection. This definition includes formal multilateral assignment regimes (for example, the Dublin II Regulation); 6 formal bilateral
assignment regimes (for example, the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country
Agreement);' 7 formal mandatory extraterritorial processing of claims (for
As Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo explains, one of the concepts-safe third country-"has
13.
managed to ground itself so firmly in the discourse of governments, academics and even
NGOs that the debate does not address the lawfulness of the practice itself, but ratherseemingly accepting it-focuses on the specific requirements that are to be met for a State to
be considered a safe third country." Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, The Practice of Mediterranean
States in the Context of the European Union's Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension.
The Safe Third Country Concept Revisited, 18 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 571, 595 (2006).
14.
This is particularly the case when the definition is put forward by states. For example, in 2003 the U.K. government put forward a working definition of "effective protection,"
focusing principally on primary humanitarian assistance, protection against refoulement, and
compliance with Article 3 of the European Convention. See CABINET OFFICE AND HOME OFFICE FUTURE OF MIGRATION PROJECT, A NEW VISION FOR REFUGEES: FINAL REPORT 14
(2003), available at http://www.proasyl.info/texte/europe/union/2003IUKNewVision.pdf.
One exception to this is the very comprehensive and thoughtful paper by Legomsky, supra
note 12.
15.
Colloquium, The Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere, 28 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 207 (2007) [hereinafter Michigan Guidelines].
16.
Dublin II Regulation, supra note 2.
17.
Agreement for Co-operation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from
Nationals of Third Countries, U.S.-Can., Dec. 5, 2002, State Dept. No. 05-35, 2004 WL
3269854, available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/policy/safe-third.html [hereinafter Safe
Third Country Agreement].
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example, proposals by the United Kingdom for "regional protection areas");'8 and formal unilateral transfer regimes (for example, Australia's
invocation of the "safe third country" concept).' 9 However, the principles
developed in the Michigan Guidelines are not intended to apply to other
deterrent policies, such as visa controls and carrier sanctions, which
deny access without any effort to assign protective responsibility.
It should be mentioned at the outset that, despite the imperative for
clear legal guidance on these issues, some potential problems might be
said to arise in examining the topic in the manner adopted by the Michigan Guidelines. One potential danger is that identifying the concept of
"protection elsewhere" and assessing the circumstances in which such
practices may be permissible as a matter of international law risks legitimizing state efforts to circumvent Convention obligations. However,
this position ignores the fact that states have been engaging in such practices for some time. In the absence of any clear legal guidance regarding
their authority to engage in such practices, states might assume they are
untrammeled by legal constraints or principles in instituting protection
elsewhere schemes. In particular, the fact that the Refugee Convention
does not explicitly sanction protection elsewhere policies has lent support to the view that such practices exist outside the bounds of the
Convention scheme, or that the Convention is only marginally relevant to
their legitimacy. As the UN Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees
has noted, there are "too many artificial constructs being devised to
elude responsibility for supporting and accepting refugees. The end result is to lock people out of the effective protection the Convention's
drafters had in mind., 20 Accordingly, the strong view of the Colloquium

participants is that states parties to the Refugee Convention cannot engage in practices that conflict with their Refugee Convention obligations,
and that any analysis of state responsibility for protection elsewhere
practices must be anchored in the Refugee Convention. Other relevant
international legal obligations are considered, but the primary focus is on
the Convention, the "cornerstone of the international refugee protection
regime.'
18.
For a description and analysis of this proposal, see AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 3.
See also Noll, supra note 3.
19.
For an overview, see Mathew, supra note 3; Taylor, supra note 3; Kneebone, supra
note 3.
20.
Erika Feller, Dir., Dep't of Int'l Prot., UNHCR, Effective Protection in Today's
World, Statement to the Fifty-fourth Session of the Executive Committee of UNHCR's Programme (Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/admin/ADMIN/42aO554a2.html.
Executive Comm. of the High Comm'r's Programme [ExCom], Conclusion on the
21.
Provision on International Protection Including Through Complementary Forms of
rotection, (No. 103 (LVI)-2005), availableat http:/lwww.unhcr.orglcgi-bin/texis/vtx/excom/
opendoc.htm?tbl=EXCOM&id=43576e292.
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A second possible objection to the formulation of guidelines on the
legality of protection elsewhere is that the term encompasses a number
of different practices and policies which may not be amenable to a single
analysis. However, whether the specific practice is termed "country of
first arrival," "safe third country," or "country which offers effective protection," there is no principled reason why the legal analysis should
change. In each case the question is whether a state party to the Refugee
Convention can, consistently with its Convention obligations, transfer a
refugee to another state.22 This was also the consensus on the concept of
effective protection of the UNHCR Lisbon Expert Roundtable, which
concluded that, "[f]rom the point of view of identifying the elements of
effective protection in the context of return to third countries, the distinction between the so-called 'safe'23 third country and the country of first
asylum concepts is not relevant."
This Article first questions the legitimacy of protection elsewhere
practices. It then considers the circumstances in which the transfer of
refugees might take place. It should be emphasized that the Michigan
Guidelines set out the minimum requirements and constraints imposed
by international law when a state wishes to implement a protection elsewhere policy. In addition, in some instances the Michigan Guidelines
engage in "progressive development" of the law by suggesting safeguards that, while not strictly required by international law, should be
respected in order to ensure the implementation of such policies in a way
that protects and ensures the rights of refugees.
II. THE LEGITIMACY OF PROTECTION
ELSEWHERE PRACTICES

A crucial initial question is whether the Refugee Convention authorizes or prohibits protection elsewhere practices. This is an exercise in
ascertaining the "ordinary meaning" of the text, "in ... context, and in
the light of [the Convention's] object and purpose. 24 The text of the
Refugee Convention does not explicitly authorize such practices.25
Rather, as alluded to above, it is commonly argued that authorization for
such practices is derived from an omission in the Convention text, that is,
22.
This is also the position taken by Stephen Legomsky. Legomsky, supra note 12, at
570-71.
23.
Lisbon Conclusions, supra note 11, 10.
24.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
25.
Interestingly, a draft document setting out proposals for a reform agenda by the
U.K. Cabinet Office and Home Office in February 2003 suggested "an amendment of the
1951 Refugee Convention to allow for the return to safe havens." Noll, supra note 3, at 315.

Winter 2007]

Protection Elsewhere

a negative implication is drawn from the limits of the positive obligations actually imposed on state parties. The question thus arises whether
this is a legitimate implication.
The Refugee Convention is not silent about the possibility of a person
losing an entitlement to protection because she has found protection elsewhere. Indeed, it explicitly provides for this in three situations, none of
which provide support for the new regime of protection elsewhere. First,
where a person has more than one nationality, he will not satisfy the definition of a refugee if he has "not availed himself of the protection of one26
of the countries of which he is a national," without "any valid reason.,
Second, Article 1E of the Convention provides that the Convention "shall
not apply" to a person "who is recognized by the competent authorities of
the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that
country.' 27 Finally, even where the Refugee Convention once applied to a
and "enjoys
refugee, it will cease to apply if he acquires a new nationality
28
nationality."
new
his
of
country
the
the protection of
In each of these three situations, it is assumed that the putative refugee enjoys a level of protection in a third country equivalent to what
nationals enjoy in that third country (either because he is a national or
because he has acquired the same rights as a national). As emphasized by
the decisions of a number of domestic judges, any protection available to a
refugee by virtue of one of these situations must be meaningful or effective. For example, in the context of the exclusion based on dual nationality,
the Federal Court of Australia has emphasized that it is not sufficient that
the country of second nationality will provide mere protection from persecution; rather, "effective nationality" is required which "provides all of the
protection and rights to which a national is entitled.., under customary or
conventional international law.' 29 Similarly, the Federal Court of Australia
26.
Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 1A(2).
27.
Id. art. 1E.
28.
Id. art. 1(C)(3).
29.
Lay Kon Tji v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1998) 158 A.L.R. 681,
691 (Austl.). See also Jong Kim Koe v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
(MIMA) (1997) 74 F.C.R. 508 (Austl.). The New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority
(RSAA) endorsed the Federal Court's decision in Lay Kon Tji, including the need for "effective nationality," in Refugee Appeal No. 71322/99, 26 (Sept. 19, 2000). See also Refugee
Appeal No. 2067/94, at II (July 4, 1996), in which the RSAA cited with approval the view of
James Hathaway:
[B]oth scholarly opinion and UNHCR recommendations urge that the only relevant
issue is the effectiveness of the new nationality, however it came to be acquired.
Specifically, the refugee must be able to enter her new state of citizenship, reside
there with protection against deportation or expulsion, and enjoy a reasonable expectation that her basic human rights will be fully respected.
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has held that the rights and obligations afforded the refugee in the country
of de facto nationality (that is, where Article 1E applies) "must be the
same as those of a national but fall short of a grant of citizenship."30 For
example, the mere grant of Convention rights in the other state will not
suffice.' The Canadian Federal Court has similarly emphasized the importance of protection that goes well beyond protection from persecution
in the context of Article lE, requiring "clear evidence that a person enjoys all of the rights of a national."32 In particular, the "most fundamental
basic rights associated with nationality of a country" to be afforded the
refugee in the third state must include, at a minimum, "the right to return, the right to reside for an unlimited period of time, the right to study,
the right to work, and access to basic social services."33
By contrast, while the Refugee Convention requires states to ensure
a variety of important rights protections for refugees, the protection required is often less than that provided to nationals. For example, in some
cases it is equivalent only to what aliens enjoy generally,3 4 and in other
cases it is equivalent to that enjoyed by those with most favored nation
status. Thus, the Refugee Convention explicitly excludes a person from
its protection only in situations in which a potential refugee enjoys a
higher level of protection in a third state. It is noteworthy that recogni30.
Barzideh v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1996) 69 F.C.R. 417, 428
(Austl.).
31.
Id. at 428-29.
32.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. Choovak, [2002] F.C. 573, [34
(Can.). See also Hassanzadeh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2003] F.C.
1494, 19 (Can.).
33.
Hassanzadeh, [2003] EC. 1494, 19 (citing LORNE WALDMAN, THE DEFINITION
OF CONVENTION REFUGEE

§ 8.481 (2001)). This ruling has been adopted by a number of

Federal Court judgments. See, e.g., Choovak, [2002] F.C. 573, 32. See also Shamlou v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1995] F.C. 1537, %36 (Can.); Kanesharan v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1996] F.C. 1278, 11 (Can.); Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. Sartaj, [2006] F.C. 399, 9 (Can.) (all citing LORNE
WALDMAN,

1 IMMIGRATION

LAW AND PRACTICE

§ 8.479 (1992) (loose-leaf). In particular, it

has been emphasized that the right to return to and stay in the third country must not be "at the
sufferance of the [relevant] government." Choezom v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2004] F.C. 1608, 14 (Can.). This emphasis on social and economic rights is
also found in the case law related to the "firm resettlement" provisions in the United States.
See, e.g., Sall v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2006); Mussie v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 172 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 1999); Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2004);
Soleimani v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 20 I. & N. Dec. 99 (BIA 1989).
34.
Article 7(1) of the Refugee Convention provides that "[e]xcept where this Convention contains more favourable provisions, a Contracting State shall accord to refugees the
same treatment as is accorded to aliens generally." Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art.
7(1).
35.
This is the case with respect to the right to freedom of nonpolitical association and
the right to engage in wage-earning employment. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF
REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 230-34 (2005). See also Nagalingam v. Minister for
Immigration, Local Gov't & Ethnic Affairs (1992) 38 F.C.R. 191, 198 (Austl.).
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tion as a refugee in a third state does not of itself explicitly exclude a
person from the Convention's protection.36 States invoking the current
protection elsewhere concept seek not only to imply a further "third
country" exception into the Refugee Convention, but to find such an exception applicable even where a person enjoys less protection than that
afforded by the Refugee Convention. This is because many states consider only Article 33 to be applicable as a constraint on transfer, ignoring
the question whether the refugee would enjoy the other rights and entitlements set out in the Convention in that other state. Further, some
states find the implied exception applicable even where a person does
not have a legal right to enter or reside in the third country.37
As a basic principle of interpretation, one might argue that the expressio unius principle-the doctrine that the explicit mention of certain
exceptions operates so as to exclude others-precludes this line of reasoning. This could be argued to apply a fortiori in the context of a
human rights treaty, such as the Refugee Convention, since exclusions
from protection should in any case be given a narrow interpretation. Indeed, a number of domestic judges have voiced concern regarding the
legitimacy of implying an exception into the Refugee Convention in this
way.3 8 For example, Justice Gray of the Australian Federal Court has
suggested that the reasoning on which the "effective protection" doctrine
is based in Australian law "appears flawed."3 9 He explains:

36.
In Barzideh, Justice Hill explicitly considered this argument, holding, "[o]f course
it is true that a person who is granted de facto citizenship and has rights no less than those of a
refugee under the Convention has no need for the grant of refugee status. But that is not to the
point. Had the members of the United Nations intended to exclude from refugee status a person who has been granted by the state of residence rights no less than those of refugee status
(albeit not all the rights of a national), they could have said so." Barzideh v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1996) 69 F.C.R. 417, 427 (Austl.). See also Nagalingam (1992)
38 F.C.R. at 198 ("The question which requires determination is whether recognition by the
host country of a person as a refugee confers upon the refugee the same rights and imposes
upon him the same obligations, which are attached to the possession of nationality of that
country.").
37.
This has been accepted in the Australian case law. See, e.g., V872/OOA v. Minister
for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002) F.C.R. 185 (Austl.) (unreported judgment).
38.
Although not directly concerned with the doctrine of "effective protection," a similar argument appears to have been made by Justice Finkelstein in Lay Kon Tji in the context of
the exclusion based on dual nationality, discussed above. After surveying the three situations
in which "international protection" is not available in the Refugee Convention (i.e., dual nationality, Article IC(3) and Article IE), his Honour noted, "[tihese articles proceed on the
assumption that international protection under the Convention will not be available only when
fully effective nationalprotection is availablefrom some other state although, of course, in the
case of Art. I E de facto protection from that other State will suffice'" Lay Kon Tji v. Minister
for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1998) 158 A.L.R. 681, 691 (Austl.) (emphasis added).
39.
NAFG v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003)
131 FC.R. 57, 60 (Austl.) (Gray, J., dissenting).
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Article 33 of the Convention, on which the reasoning rests, does
not authorize a country party to the Convention to return a person to whom it otherwise owes protection obligations to any
other country. Article 33 imposes a negative obligation.. ..0
Similarly, Justice Kirby of the Australian High Court has stated that
"[w]ithout clear language in the Convention to support such a course, I
would not introduce such relief from Convention 'protection obligations'
by a process of implication inimical to the Convention's objectives,
terms and practical operation."'
However, one may argue that these explicit exceptions do not preclude reliance on an implicit protection elsewhere policy, as such
exceptions speak to the definition of a refugee, set out in Article 1. They
therefore serve the function of delimiting the class of persons to whom
the Convention rights regime applies. By contrast, in invoking protection
elsewhere policies, states do not generally seek to argue that a person is
excluded from protection, but that protection can be provided elsewhere. 2 In other words, the idea is that a state acknowledges and accepts
that it has some protection obligations to a refugee who is within its jurisdiction or territory, but submits that it may fulfill those protection
obligations by transferring refugees to another state.
Turning to articles other than Article 1 of the Convention, it is relevant to consider whether Articles 31-33 shed light on a state's authority
to institute protection elsewhere practices. Article 31(2) refers to the possibility of a refugee obtaining "admission into another country." This
article, however, should be interpreted in its particular context. Article
31(1) prohibits the imposition of penalties on refugees who enter the
country or are present unlawfully. Article 31(2) sets out a narrow exception to this prohibition by providing that a state shall not restrict the
freedom of movement of such persons except as necessary, but any such
"necessary" restrictions apply only until the applicants' "status in the
country is regularized or they obtain admission into another country." To
the extent that this envisages movement, it indicates a sense of volition
on the part of a refugee, who may wish to seek admission into another
state. In this context, a state must "allow such refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into another

40.

Id.

NAGV of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
41.
(2005) 213 A.L.R. 668, 93 (Austl.) (Kirby, J.).
However, as Taylor points out, the Australian government's position "is that it does
42.
not 'owe protection obligations' to persons who would be 'adequately protected in a safe third
country.'" See Taylor, supra note 3, at 283.
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country."43 This article of the Convention therefore neither expressly authorizes nor prohibits protection elsewhere practices."
Article 32 of the Convention proscribes the expulsion of refugees
"save on grounds of national security or public order" and requires that
due process be afforded an individual refugee prior to expulsion.4'5 However, this does not apply until a refugee is "lawfully present" in the
territory of the relevant state party.46 This suggests some flexibility between the point at which Article 33 is activated (explored below) and the
point at which a refugee is lawfully present in a state, during which a
state is not explicitly constrained from removing a refugee to a third
state.
In addition to this textual analysis, it is also relevant to refer to "soft
law" developments pertinent to this issue.4 ' Emerging state practice has
43.
Refugee Convention, supra note 1,art. 31(2).
44.
Note that the application in Article 31(1) of protection from penalization to refugees who come "directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the
sense of article 1" is sometimes said to impose a duty on refugees to seek refugee status in the
first country of arrival (and therefore to support implicitly a protection elsewhere policy which
adopts a "first country of arrival" rule). However, this is limited to the specific context-the
question whether a refugee can claim exemption from laws that penalize unlawful entry-and
does not apply to situations where a refugee has merely transited through third countries.
HATHAWAY, supra note 35, at 394-98.
45.
Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 32(2). This clause provides:
The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in
accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons of national
security otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear
himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the purpose before competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the competent authority.
Id. See also HATHAWAY, supra note 35, at 694-95 (describing an individuated assessment
prior to expulsion).
46.
Michigan Guidelines, supra note 15, 5. The Guidelines hold that the concept of
"lawful presence" must be defined by the sending state in good faith and in accordance with
the requirements of international law. Further, "lawful presence is in any event established not
later than such time as a decision is reached on the admissibility of the protection claim." Id.
See also Rajendran v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 F.C.R. 526,
530-531 (Austl.) (noting that, "[iln the present case, Mr. Rajendran ...now holds a bridging
visa. If his application for a [refugee status-based] protection visa is ultimately unsuccessful
...that visa will cease to have effect at the time stipulated in the relevant Migration regulations ... whereupon he will both cease to be lawfully in Australia and able to invoke Article
32"); Szoma v. Sec'y of State for Work & Pensions, (2006) 1 A.C. 564, 29 (U.K.) (explaining that there is no reason why the "lawful presence" requirement for U.K. income support
"should be construed as requiring more ...than that they are at large here pursuant to the
express written authority of an immigration officer provided for by the statute").
47.
This Section analyzes ExCom Resolutions as "soft law" rather than as subsequent
agreement or practice, pursuant to the Vienna Convention, supra note 24. This is because it is
questionable whether documents produced by a limited number of state parties could be said
to constitute agreement between the parties for the purpose of Article 31 (3)(a) of the Vienna
Convention. It is also unlikely that such documents could be considered "state practice" for
the purposes of Article 31(3)(b). Not all parties to the Convention participate in formulating

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 28:223

led the UNHCR to provide guidance in various forms over the past few
decades to states seeking to apply these principles in practice. In the earliest relevant elucidation of these principles, the UNHCR Executive
Committee (ExCom) advised states that "[t]he intentions of the asylum
seeker as regards the country in which he wishes to request asylum
should as far as possible be taken into account ....Regard should be
had to the concept that asylum should not be refused solely on the
ground that it could be sought from another state."' 4 While this appeared
to allow refugees some choice in the country in which they could seek
protection, 9 subsequent ExCom conclusions arguably have moved away
from this position.' In particular, ExCom 71 recognized
the advisability of concluding agreements among States directly
concerned, in consultation with UNHCR, to provide for the protection of refugees through the adoption of common criteria and
related arrangements to determine which State shall be responsible for considering an application for asylum and refugee status
and for granting the protection required, and thus avoiding orbit
situations!'
More specifically, while the UNHCR has set out a range of constraints
on the ability of states to transfer refugees to third countries, it "does not
object in principle to the notion of designating countries as 'safe third
countries.' ,5 2 Thus, the focus for the UNHCR has not been on the legality of the practice per se but rather on what safeguards must be present
before a state may transfer refugees to another state.
Executive Committee Conclusions; ExCom is composed of only seventy countries. See
UNHCR, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, http:/www.
unhcr.org/excoml4011 laab4.html).
48.
U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, A THEMATIC COMPILATION OF EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS 344, 345 (No. 15 (XXX)-1979) (2d ed. 2005), available at http://
www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL3d4ab3ff2.pdf [hereinafter CONCLUSIONS].
49.
The UNCHR qualifies this by saying, "[w]here, however, it appears that a person,
before requesting asylum, already has a connection or close links with another State, he may if
it appears fair and reasonable be called upon first to request asylum from that State." Id. at 345
(No. 15 (XXX)-1979).
50.
See, e.g., ExCom Conclusion No. 15, which provides that "[r]efugees and asylumseekers who, having found protection in a particular country, should normally not move from

that country in an irregular manner in order to find durable solutions elsewhere but should take
advantage of durable solutions available in that country." CONCLUSIONS, supra note 48, at 139
(No. 15 (XL)-1989).
51.
CONCLUSIONS, supra note 48, at 332 (No. 71(k) (XLIV)-1993). See also id. at 352
(No. 74(p) (XLV)-1994) (acknowledging "the value of regional harmonization of national
policies to ensure that persons who are in need of international protection actually receive it").
52.
U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Note on Key Issues of Concern to UNHCR on the
Draft Asylum ProceduresDirective, I 1 (March 2004), available at http:llwww.ecre.orglpress/
UNHCRsconcemdirective.DOC.
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The analysis of the relevant text of the Refugee Convention thus leads
to the conclusion that, as noted in the Guidelines, the 1951 Convention
neither expressly authorizes nor prohibits reliance on protection elsewhere
policies. Given this conclusion, we must next consider under what conditions and in what situations a state may legitimately rely on this concept.
III.

IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES MAY A STATE IMPLEMENT A

PROTECTION ELSEWHERE POLICY?

Before considering the rights that must be respected in order for a
protection elsewhere policy to be implemented in accordance with the
Refugee Convention (Parts IV-V below), it is important to consider the
circumstances in which such a policy may be effected. The two salient
questions in this regard are whether a state may transfer a refugee to the
control of a nonstate entity, and whether the state to which the refugee is
to be transferred must be a party to the Refugee Convention.
A. To Whom May a State TransferRefugees Under
a ProtectionElsewhere Scheme?
An initial question is whether the protection of Refugee Convention
rights in the third state must be ensured by the state, or whether refugees
may be transferred to a third state in which protection will be delivered
by nonstate entities, such as ethnic clans or leaders, nongovernmental organizations, or even the UNHCR. It is important to observe that the
refugee protection obligations imposed by Articles 2-33 of the Convention
are specifically addressed to states.53 Indeed, the "very structure of the
1951 Convention requires that protection will be provided not by some
legally unaccountable entity with de facto control, but rather by a government capable of assuming and being held responsible under international
law for its actions. '5 4 Therefore, a nonstate entity is not capable of delivering Refugee Convention protection in a third state.55
53.
J.C. Hathaway & M. Foster, Internal Protection/Relocation/FlightAlternative as an
Aspect of Refugee Status Determination, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
357, 411 (Erika Feller, Volker Tirk & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003).
54.
Id. The only exception to this is Article ID of the Convention, which provides that
the Convention does not apply to persons who "at present [are] receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
protection or assistance." Refugee Convention, supra note 1,art. ID. However, this is a very
narrow exception to the general approach in the Convention, and in any case it is limited to the
delivery of protection by the United Nations (as opposed to other "third parties" such as those
with de facto control).
55.
It should be noted that a different approach has sometimes been adopted in the context
of the question whether a nonstate entity may deliver protection to a person, such that they cannot be said to have a well-founded fear of persecution. For example, the EU Qualification
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One exception to this is a situation where a (third) state has delegated to the UNHCR the task of undertaking status determination in that
state. 56 In such a case, it may be sufficient for the UNHCR to make such
assessments as long as the state in that third country ultimately delivers
Convention protection to any transferred refugees. 7 Thus, the Guidelines
conclude that "any sharing-out of protection responsibility must take
place between and among states. 58
B. De Jure and De Facto Compliance
with the Refugee Convention

The second fundamental initial question is whether it is necessary
for the third state (to which refugees will be transferred) to be a party to
the Refugee Convention. Further, is it necessary for the third state to be a
party to precisely the same rights regime as the sending state (for example, is it a requirement that the third state has not entered significant
reservations to the refugee rights regime)?59 If so, is this de jure compliance a sufficient condition to establish the legality of transfer, or is the
transferring state additionally obligated to assess whether refugee rights
will be delivered in practice? Although this issue pertains to all Refugee
Convention rights, there might be some differentiation between Article
33 and other articles. This is because some have argued that the rule embodied in Article 33-non-refoulement-has now attained the status of
customary international law. 60 If this is the case, then arguably every
Directive provides that, in assessing whether persecution is established on the basis that there
is no protection against serious harm, protection can be provided by "parties or organisations,
including international organisations, controlling the State or a substantial part of the territory
of the State." Council Directive 2004/83/EC, art. 7(1), 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12, 16 (EC).
56.
Legomsky argues that, "[f]rom an effective protection standpoint, it should not
matter who provides the refugee status determination as long as all the components of fairness
are in place. Thus, a particular third country might delegate the determination to UNHCR."
Legomsky, supra note 12, at 655.
It should be noted that the UNHCR has itself recognized that its presence in a coun57.
try "cannot be equated with the provision of effective protection. International protection is
afforded by States and not by an international organization." U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees,
UNHCR's Views on the Concept of Effective Protection as it Relates to Indonesia (Dec. 2,
2004), available at http://www.unhcr.org.au/pdfs/EFFECT.pdf.
58.
Michigan Guidelines, supra note 15, at 4.
59.
This issue has arisen in practice. For example, Taylor notes that while Australia has
return agreements with Nauru and Papua New Guinea, Nauru is not a party to the Convention
and Papua New Guinea, although a party, "has made significant reservations" (including to
Articles 17(1), 21, 22(1), 26, 31, 32, and 34 of the Convention). See Savitri Taylor, The Pacific
Solution or a Pacific Nightmare? The Difference between Burden Shifting and Responsibility
Sharing, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 1, 9 (2005).
60.
See, e.g., Sir Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the
Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 89, 163 (Erika Feller et al.
eds., 2003). See also U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial
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"safe third country" is bound by this obligation, regardless of whether it
has ratified the Refugee Convention, rendering formal ratification irrelevant. However, not all scholars agree that Article 33 has attained this
status. It is therefore necessary to consider whether de jure compliance
with the Convention is a prerequisite to a state's receiving refugees transferred from a state party.
Regarding the question of whether accession to the Refugee Convention is a necessary (albeit perhaps not sufficient) condition for
consideration as a "safe third country," James Hathaway observes that
the Refugee Convention drafters thought "state parties to the Convention
should be free to share out the duty to protect refugees., 6 ' The assumption was that "whatever allocation of responsibility might occur would
be as among countries all bound by international refugee law, and would
lead to full protection of refugee rights in the destination country. 62
However, in practice a number of states, most notably Australia, have
recently taken the view that while the third state's accession to the Refugee Convention is a relevant consideration, it is not necessary in order to
conclude that the third state will deliver "effective protection" to the
transferred refugee.63
The UNHCR has similarly taken the view that it is not a prerequisite
that a third country be a party to the Refugee Convention. 6' It has expressed strong preference, however, for an approach that emphasizes the
importance of this factor.6 ' This was also the approach of the Lisbon Expert Roundtable, which concluded that "accession to and compliance
with the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol are essential, unless the

Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, at 7 (Jan. 26, 2007), available at http://www.unhcr.org/home/
RSDLEGAI.45fi 7al a4.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR Advisory Opinion].
61.
HATHAWAY, supra note 35, at 328.
62.
Id.
63.
In Australia, this is so under legislation and in the case law. See, e.g., NAFG v.
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (MIMA) (2003) 131 F.C.R. 57
(Austl.); Kola v. MIMA (2002) 120 F.C.R. 170 (Austl.); Patto v. MIMA (2000) 106 FC.R. 119
(Austi.); MIMA v. Al-Sallal (1999) 94 F.C.R. 549 (Austl). Under the Dublin Convention, all
other states are parties. However, more recent European proposals appear to envisage that the
third state may not be a party to the Convention. Rosemary Byrne and Andrew Shacknove
note that "[a]ccession to the 1951 Geneva Convention and incorporation through domestic
legislation are not required by many EU States for recognition of a safe country of asylum."
Rosemary Byrne & Andrew Shacknove, The Safe Country Notion in European Asylum Law, 9
HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 185, 200 (1996). The authors provide numerous examples of European
governments removing refugee applicants to third countries that are not parties to the Convention. Id. at 201 n.60.
64.
Legomsky, supra note 12, at 658-59 (citing UNHCR views).
65.
Id.
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destination country can demonstrate that the third State has developed
a
66
practice akin to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol."
Notwithstanding these concessions that something less than formal
ratification may be sufficient, strong arguments support the view that
accession should be required in every case in order for a lawful transfer
to be made. As Rosemary Byrne and Andrew Shacknove emphasize, "accession matters," as it "represents a binding commitment by a State to
respect the provisions of the Convention and to implement those provi,,61
sions in practice. If a third state is not even obligated as a matter of
international law to implement rights to which a refugee is already entitled in the sending state, then it is open to question whether the transfer
will result in the protection of refugee rights.68
Perhaps the most compelling argument in favor of the requirement
of formal accession is that accession to the Refugee Convention involves
a commitment by state parties to cooperate with the UNHCR to facilitate
its duty "of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention. 69 In particular, states undertake to "provide [the UNHCR] in the
appropriate form with information and statistical data requested concerning ... the condition of refugees, the implementation of th[e]
Convention, and laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force relating to refugees., 70 As Stephen Legomsky notes, the
fact that a state is a party to the Refugee Convention "gives the UNHCR
a degree of leverage that it might not otherwise have"; in particular, "it
increases the chance that UNHCR will be able to influence that country's policies, that the country will guarantee asylum seekers access to
UNHCR, and that the country will otherwise cooperate with UNHCR in
66.
Lisbon Conclusions, supra note 11, 15(e) (emphasis added).
67.
Byrne & Shacknove, supra note 63, at 200. The authors further assert that "[i]n
many cases, notably in Asia, governments have, after consideration, declined to accede to the
Convention, thereby formally indicating that they do not recognize international obligations
for refugee protection." Id. Taylor also makes this point, noting that "the fact that a state has
chosen not to make a formal commitment to act in accordance with the relevant treaty regimes
must cast significant doubt on the strength of its political commitment to act in practice in a
manner consonant with those regimes." Taylor, supra note 3, at 295.
68.
Most of the Australian authority supports the view that it is not strictly necessary
for the third state to be a signatory to the Convention. See, e.g., NAFG, (2003) 131 F.C.R. 57;
Kola, (2002) 120 F.C.R. 170; Patto, (2000) 106 FC.R. 119; Al-Sallal, (1999) 94 F.C.R. 549.

There is, however, some support for the opposite view. See, e.g., AI-Sallal v. MIMA (1999)
F.C.A. 369, [ 34 (Austl.) (unreported judgment) (noting "[i]t appears to me that to speak ...
of the need for there to be effective insurance that there would be no breach of Art. 33(1) by
the third country concerned if the person concerned happened to be a refugee necessarily
implied that that country would be a party to the Convention. A country could hardly be in
breach of Art. 33(1) otherwise," but finding an equivalent binding obligation would suffice).
See also Sameh v. MIMA (1999) F.C.A. 875 (Austl.) (unreported judgment).
69.
Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 35(1).
70.
Id. art. 35(2).
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its supervisory role."7' One may add to this that the requirement that a
state party furnish UNHCR with the information set out above would
result in more cogent assessments of de facto rights delivery to refugees
in that country, thereby enabling states wishing to transfer refugees to
accurately assess the extent of protection offered in third states.72 In light
of these factors, Legomsky suggests it is arguable that a state "breaches
its obligation to facilitate UNHCR's supervisory duties if the state returns an asylum seeker to a state that UNHCR lacks the authority to
'
supervise." 73
An alternative characterization might be that sending a refugee to a
state that is not a party to the Refugee Convention, where the UNHCR
has no formal supervisory authority, results in a reduction in refugee protection. Although some nonparty states allow the UNHCR in practice to
supervise treatment of refugees, it is arguable that this is not sufficient,
as such states are not legally obligated to do so and may thus refuse to
cooperate at any time.74
An additional but often overlooked point is that accession to the
Refugee Convention includes the compulsory obligation to submit to the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in relation to "any dispute between parties to the Convention., 75 Although this has never been
invoked by any state party, it remains the case that by acceding to the
Refugee Convention, parties submit to another important form of potential
supervision. By removing a refugee to a state that is not party to the Refugee Convention, a state precludes the possibility of any formal supervision

71.
Legomsky, supra note 12, at 660.
72.
Byrne and Shacknove assert that in most cases, "non-signatories are less likely to
have established the administrative structures necessary for status determination and refugee
protection" Byrne & Shacknove, supra note 63, at 200.
73.
Legomsky, supra note 12, at 660. It is important to note, however, that Legomsky
ultimately concludes that "international law does not flatly prohibit the return of refugees to
third countries that are not parties to the 1951 Convention." Id. at 661.
74.
This is borne out by UNHCR's explanation of the situation in Malaysia. As the
UNHCR notes, Malaysia is not a party to the Convention and it has "no constitutional, legislative or administrative provisions dealing with the right to seek asylum or the protection of
refugees" Although there is "a considerable degree of cooperation in the protection of refugees between UNHCR and the Malaysian authorities ....
a consistent implementation of oral
agreements and political decisions in form of specific laws, regulations or instructions is still
lacking." U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, UNHCR's Views on the Concept of Effective Protection as it Relates to Malaysia (Mar. 31, 2005), available at http://www.unhcr.org.au/pdfsl
Malaysia.pdf.
75.
Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 38. The jurisdiction is compulsory because
Article 42 prohibits reservations to be made to this section. However, this has never been invoked by any state party.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 28:223

vis-A-vis the delivery of refugee rights,76 arguably reducing the scope of
refugee protection.77
Thus, one concern in the "safe third country" context is the importance of ensuring continuing international supervision following transfer.
This idea finds support in the jurisprudence of international human rights
bodies. It has arisen, for instance, in the context of decisions by the
Committee against Torture in considering whether a state party is in violation of its obligation not to send a person to a country "where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture. 78 In a number of decisions, the Committee has
taken into account the fact that the state to which transfer is proposed is
not a party to the Convention against Torture in finding that a state party
will be in violation of its non-refoulement obligation. For example, in
Mutombo v. Switzerland, the Committee stated, "in view of the fact that
Zaire is not a party to the Convention, the author would be in danger, in
the event of expulsion to Zaire, not only of being subjected to torture but
of no longer having the legal possibility of applying to the Committee
for protection. '79 Although this reasoning, while analogous, does not apply precisely to the Refugee Convention-since neither of the
supervisory mechanisms described above provide individual refugees
with "the legal possibility of applying" directly for protection-the fact
remains that transfer to a nonstate party removes the refugee from any
formal international supervision.
In light of this analysis, a state wishing to transfer a refugee to another state must ensure that the third state is a party to the Convention.
76.
Phuong also refers to the ICJ's jurisdiction as a relevant factor. Catherine Phuong,
The Concept of "Effective Protection" in the Context of IrregularSecondary Movements and
Protection in Regions of Origin, GLOBAL MIGRATION PERSPECTIVES, Apr. 2005, at 1, 4. However, she ultimately concludes that state practice is more important than formal accession.
77.
In Ruhani, Justice Kirby noted that "Nauru is not a party to the Refugees Convention and Protocol. This fact itself made the removal of the appellant by Australian officials to
Nauru a source of potential disadvantage for him." Ruhani v. Dir. of Police (2005) 222 C.L.R.
489, 68 (Austl.).
78.
United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 3, June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention
against Torture].
79.
U.N. Comm. against Torture, Commc'n No. 13/1993: Mutombo v. Switzerland,
9.6, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/12/D/13/1993 (Apr. 27, 1994). See also U.N. Comm. against Torture,
Commc'n No. 15/1994: Khan v. Canada, 12.5, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/13/D/15/1994 (Nov. 18,
1994) ("Moreover, the Committee considers that, in view of the fact that Pakistan is not a
party to the Convention, the author would not only be in danger of being subjected to torture,
in the event of his forced return to Pakistan, but would no longer have the possibility of applying to the Committee for protection."). Conversely, the Committee thought it significant in
Attia v. Sweden "that Egypt, a State party to the Convention, is directly bound properly to treat
prisoners within its jurisdiction, and any failure to do so would be a breach of the Convention." U.N. Comm. against Torture, Commc'n No. 199/2002,
12.3, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/31/
D/199/2002 (Nov. 24, 2003).
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The only exception to this is where a state is satisfied that, despite not
being a party to the Convention, a third state in fact respects the full
range of rights set by the Refugee Convention, including the facilitation
of UNHCR supervision. The reference to "in fact" indicates that, regardless of whether a third state is a party to the Refugee Convention, the
sending state is under a further obligation to assess whether the third
state respects relevant Refugee Convention rights in practice.As the Full
Federal Court of Australia has noted:
It is a sad reality of modem times that countries do not always
honour human rights, whether enshrined in domestic constitutions or in international treaties to which they are parties. To
treat the fact of a country being a party to the Convention as
conclusive would be a distortion of the Convention's language
and subversive of its underlying purpose.80
The approach taken by supervisory bodies in relation to other international human rights treaties also supports this conclusion. For
example, in Alan v. Switzerland,8 the Committee against Torture considered Switzerland's argument that it would not be in violation of its nonrefoulement obligation in returning the applicant to Turkey, since "Turkey is a party to the Convention against Torture and has recognized the
Committee's competence ... to receive and examine individual commu-

nications."" In rejecting this argument, the Committee explained that it
regretfully notes, however, that practice of torture is still systematic in Turkey, as attested to in the Committee's findings in its
inquiry under article 20 of the Convention. The Committee observes that the main aim and purpose of the Convention is to
prevent torture, not to redress torture once it has occurred, and
finds that the fact that Turkey is a party to the Convention and
has recognized the Committee's competence under article 22,
does not, in the circumstances of the instant case, constitute a

sufficient guarantee for the author's security.83
This implies not only that de jure compliance is insufficient but that an
individual assessment must be undertaken in each case in order to assess
whether the third country is safe for a particular refugee.
80.
MIMA v. A1-Sallal, (1999) 94 F.C.R. 549, T 47 (Austl). It should be noted that the
court then went on to state that "[t]he converse must logically follow. As a matter of fact, parties may have better effective protection in some countries which are not parties to the
Convention... than in many which are." Id.
81.
U.N. Comm. against Torture, Commc'n No. 21/1995, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/16/D/21/
1995 (May 8, 1996).
82.
Id. 11.5.
83.
Id. (emphasis added).
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FOR REFUGEE RIGHTS: NON-REFOULEMENT

We now turn to a consideration of the substantive rights which must
be respected in the third state under the Refugee Convention, thereby
constraining a state's ability to transfer refugees pursuant to a protection
elsewhere policy.
A. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention
Article 33's principle of non-refoulement requires that, before a state
may transfer or remove a refugee to another state, it must ensure that the
refugee does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a
Convention reason in that third state. This is the least controversial constraint on state choice in this context, since no state has contended that it
is not bound to respect Article 33 in effecting a transfer to a third country.84

The more complex issue in this context relates to the notion of indirect refoulement, that is, the possibility that a third state, while itself safe
for a refugee due to a lack of risk of persecution, may in fact return the
refugee to her country of origin, in which a well-founded fear of persecution exists. The notion that Article 33 extends to both direct and
indirect refoulement is not controversial." The prohibition in Article 33
on refoulement "in any manner whatsoever" supports the view that states
are prohibited from removing a refugee directly to a state of persecution,
as well as indirectly to a state that is in turn likely to return the refugee to
the state of persecution 6 As the House of Lords has noted,
84.
As Legomsky notes, "[t]his interpretation of Article 33 has not been contested, and
UNHCR has specifically embraced it." Legomsky, supra note 12, at 633 (citing UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No. 15, CONCLUSIONS, supra note 48, at 139 (No. 15 (XL)-1989). See also
U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Subcomm. of the Whole on Int'l Prot. of the Executive
Comm., Background Note on the Safe Third Country Concept and Refgee Status, I 13, 42d
Sess., U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/68 (July 26, 1991).
85.
As Legomsky notes, UNHCR has "repeatedly stressed" that this is so, and "the
European Commission, the Council of Europe, and the U.K. House of Lords have all endorsed
that proposition, as have commentators." Legomsky, supra note 12, at 618. See also SYMES &
JORRO, supra note 8, at 303-04, for relevant authorities. Even in Australia, which has taken
one of the most extreme positions on effective protection, judges have accepted that Article 33
prohibits indirect refoulement as well as direct refoulement. See, e.g., Thiagarajah Gnanapiragasam v. MIMA (1998) 88 F.C.R. 1 (Austl.) (Weinberg, J.).
86.
It should be noted that the drafting history also supports this view. Hathaway explains that in response to a Swedish proposal that indirect refoulement be explicitly prohibited,
some participants noted that it "was not necessary, since, 'if such expulsion presented a threat
of subsequent forcible return to the country of origin, the life and liberty of the refugee in
question were endangered' by the removal to the intermediate state." HATHAWAY, supra note
35, at 323 (quoting statement by Mr. Larsen of Denmark at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons). As Hathaway explains, "[t]he relevant
issue was said to be theforseeabilityof the ultimate consequences of the initial expulsion." Id.
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[flor a country to return a refugee to a state from which he will
then be returned by the government of that state to a territory
where his life or freedom will be threatened will be as much a
breach of Article 33 as if the first country had itself returned him
there direct. This is the effect of Article 33."
It is more complicated, however, to identify precisely what protecting
against indirect refoulement requires in practice. In particular, the extent
and scope of the inquiry required to be undertaken by the sending state
to ensure that a refugee is not at risk of indirect refoulement in a third
state has proven controversial.
One key issue arises when a third state adopts a different approach to
interpreting the refugee definition from that of the sending state. This is
particularly important where the third state's interpretation of its Convention obligations is more restrictive. This could result from different
interpretations of the substantive elements of the Refugee Convention
(for instance, by interpreting the refugee definition more narrowly or by
applying the exclusionary provisions more widely),8 as well as from
R (ex parte Adan) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (2001) 2 W.L.R. 143, 165
87.
(Lord Hobhouse) (Eng.). In an earlier decision, the House of Lords emphasized that, "[t]he
one course would effect indirectly, the other directly, the prohibited result, i.e., his return 'to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened."' R (ex parte Bugdaycay ) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (1987) 2 W.L.R. 606, 620 (Lord Bridge of
Harwich) (Eng.), cited in HATHAWAY, supra note 35, at 323. See also Suresh v. Canada,
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 35-36 (Can.) ("At least where Canada's participation is a necessary precondition for the deprivation, and where the deprivation is an entirely foreseeable consequence
of Canada's participation, the government does not avoid [responsibility] because the deprivation in question would be effected by someone else's hand ....[W]e cannot pretend that
Canada is a merely passive participant.").
88.
The most obvious example of this phenomenon is the situation pertaining in Adan,
whereby Germany and France took a more restrictive approach to the scope of Convention
protection than the United Kingdom in that they would not recognize refugee claims where
the harm feared was by nonstate actors. By contrast, the United Kingdom approach would
accept such claims. Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough noted the dramatic difference in outcome produced by this situation: "The evidence in the present case discloses that only 5% of
would-be refugees from Algeria are granted asylum if they make their application in France,
whereas 80% of such applicants are successful if applying in the United Kingdom." Adan,
(2001) 2 W.L.R. at 166. Similar concerns have been voiced regarding the recent U.S.-Canada
Safe Third Country Agreement, supra note 17. For example, a number of scholars have raised
concerns that substantive differences in interpretation will result in gender-based claims,
which would have been recognized in Canada being rejected in the United States. See, e.g.,
Sonia Akibo-Betts, The Canada-USSafe Third Country Agreement: Why the US is Not a Safe
Haven for Refugee Women Asserting Gender-BasedClaims, 19 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC.
ISSUES 105 (2005); Audrey Macklin, Disappearing Refugees: Reflections on the Canada-US
Safe Third Country Agreement, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 365, 405-07 (2005). Other
differences include a stricter approach in the US to the nexus clause and membership of a
particular social group. See, e.g., Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Comments of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights On the ProposedSafe Third Country Agreement, July 24,
2002, available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/refugees/comment-safe-thirdfinal.pdf.
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different approaches to evidentiary or procedural matters (for instance,
by applying a higher standard of proof in order to find the definition satisfied).8 9 In a situation where a third country is likely to take a more
restrictive approach to interpretation or procedure, the sending state risks
committing indirect refoulement by removing a person to that third state.
This issue is complicated by the fact that, unlike with other international human rights treaties, no international adjudicatory body has the
authority to formulate authoritative and binding determinations regarding the correct interpretation of the Refugee Convention. 90 As Judge Ress
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) noted in the Bosphorous case, an indication that another entity or state does not provide
"comparable" or "equivalent" protection to that required by the European Convention on Human Rights (European Convention) would be if
that entity "were to depart from the interpretation or application of the
Convention or the protocols that had already been the subject of wellestablished ECHR case-law." 9' By contrast, in the case of the Refugee
Convention, state parties may adopt a range of interpretations, and the
question is whether a departure from the approach of the sending state is
sufficient to constitute a finding that the receiving third state is likely to
engage in the refoulement of refugees.
The correct resolution of this dilemma rests in the sending state's obligation to interpret a treaty "in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose." 92 The rules of treaty interpretation under international law thus require state parties to derive "an
independent meaning ... without taking colour from the distinctive features of the legal system of any individual contracting state. 93 The lack
of a conclusive determination about the Refugee Convention's correct
meaning by an international body does not diminish this obligation.
Rather, as the House of Lords held in Adan, this simply means that:
In practice it is left to national courts, faced with material disagreement on an issue of interpretation, to resolve it. But in
doing so it must search, untrammeled by notions of its national

89.
Legomsky, supra note 12, at 635-36.
90.
Despite UNHCR's supervisory role pursuant to Article 35 of the Refugee Convention, it is not specifically vested with authority to make such determinations, and although the
ICJ could potentially exercise this function, no state has ever invoked Article 38.
91.
Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1,
para. 3 (2006).
92.
Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 31.
93.
R (ex parte Adan) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (2001) 2 W.L.R. 143, 154
(Lord Steyn) (Eng.).
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meaning
legal culture, for the true autonomous and international
94
of the treaty. And there can only be one true meaning.
In reaching a conclusion as to the "true autonomous" meaning of the
Refugee Convention, domestic courts may consider the jurisprudence of
other state parties as well as the views of the UNHCR, represented in the
handbook, various guidelines, and ExCom conclusions. 9 However, this
does not obviate the requirement that each state must decide on the true
and correct interpretation of the Refugee Convention. As the House of
Lords has explained, states "cannot simply adopt a list of permissible or
legitimate or possible or reasonable meanings and accept that any one of
those when applied would be in compliance with the Convention. 96
Accordingly, once a state party has formulated its view as to the correct meaning of the Refugee Convention under international law, it must
ensure that the state to which it proposes to transfer a refugee does not
depart from this interpretation and application of the Convention, such
that the third state is likely to reject the claim for refugee status and return a refugee to a state in which she will be persecuted. 97 This would
apply both to the substantive definition of "refugee" and to procedural
matters. 9 As the UNHCR has emphasized in a recent assessment of the
Dublin II Regulation, "the credibility of any mechanism for transfer of
responsibility [is] contingent upon the existence of harmonised standards
in substantive and procedural areas of asylum." 99
Id.
94.
This is especially so given the UNHCR's supervisory responsibility. As Lord Steyn
95.
notes in Adan, "[u]nder articles 35 and 36 of the Geneva Convention, and under article II of
the Protocol of 1967, the UNHCR plays a critical role in the application of the Refugee Convention .... It is not surprising therefore that the UNHCR Handbook, although not binding on
states, has high persuasive authority, and is much relied on by domestic courts and tribunals."
Id. at 157.
Id. at 147 (Lord Slynn of Hadley).
96.
97.
As Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough noted in Adan, this is because, "[i]n Convention terms, it is a question of the [sending state] performing its obligation under article 33." Id.
at 168 (emphasis in original).
This issue does not appear to have been considered closely by the Australian courts
98.
in the context of the effective protection principle developed by the courts. However, in AlSallal, Justice Katz of the Federal Court made it clear that this is the correct approach. After
noting that other jurisdictions, including Canada and the United States, appeared to adopt a
stricter approach to determining well-founded fear (in terms of the standard of proof required),
his Honour noted that "neither Canada nor the United States can be a 'safe third country' for
present purposes so far as Australia is concerned. That is because a claimant for refugee status
in Australia sent to either of those countries would, if a refugee, be at risk of being refouled by
that country, in breach of Art. 33(1) (on its proper construction), to a territory as to which the
claimant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason." AI-Sallal v. MIMA
(1999) F.C.A. 369,1 16 (Austl.) (unreported judgment).
99.
UNHCR DUBLIN II, supra note 7, 11-12 (citing U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees,
Revisiting the Dublin Convention-Some Reflections by UNHCR in Response to the
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An alternative view, described as "a qualified version" of the above
approach, posits that one would "assume that some provisions lend
themselves to a single international meaning while others have multiple
permissible meanings."'' ° Under this approach, a country intending to
transfer refugees to a third state "should apply its own more favorable
interpretation whenever it regards the particular provision as susceptible
to only one true international meaning."' ' By contrast, "if the destination
country views both its own interpretation and that of the third country as
permissible, then its decision as to which one to follow should be governed by [its] own choice
0 2 of law rules and any applicable agreements
with the third country."'
The difficulty with this approach is that it is not clear on what basis a
state would decide which Refugee Convention terms properly have only
one international meaning and which are open to various interpretations.
This is particularly so given that the rules of treaty interpretation set out
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties apply to all provisions
of all treaties, thus making it difficult to take a differentiated approach to
interpretation in accordance with international law. Moreover, it raises
the risk that a sending state will simply declare that all relevant provisions are open to multiple interpretations in order to comply with the
terms of a cooperation agreement which permit it to return or send refugees to third countries.
The better view, consistent with international law, is that the sending
state will not violate Article 33 where the difference in interpretation of
the receiving state is at the level of "legal niceties and refinements."'0 3 As
Lord Hobhouse noted in Adan:
It is not to be assumed that a country which has agreed to and
adopted the Convention will then act otherwise than in accordance with its obligations under the Convention. It is certainly
not to be assumed that this will occur from the existence of differences of emphasis or from differences which can only be
discovered by a meticulous comparative examination. '°'
However, where the differences in interpretation are likely to produce
different outcomes for refugee applicants, such that a person who would
Commission Staff Working Paper (Jan. 2001), available at http://www.unhcr.org/home/
RSDLEGAL 3ae6b34c0.pdf).
100.
Legomsky, supra note 12, at 638.
101.
Id.
102.
Id. at 638-39.
103.
R (ex parteYogatharas) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2002] UKHL 35, [9,
4 Eng. Rep. 800 (U.K.).
104.
R (ex pane Adan) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (2001) 2 W.L.R. 143, 169

(Eng.).
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be considered a refugee in the sending state is unlikely to be considered
a refugee in the third state, the sending state is prohibited from returning
or transferring a refugee to that third state. '
Inherent in this requirement (that in order to transfer a refugee to a
third state there must not be any real risk that the third state will engage
in refoulement of refugees) is the need for the third state to have in place
an adjudication procedure properly to assess the claim of those refugees
transferred to its territory by the sending state. While the Refugee Convention does not explicitly contain any provisions relating to national
status determination procedures, "the principle of good faith in fulfilling
treaty obligations requires ... that States Parties to the Convention institute a procedure which allows for a determination of who is entitled to
the guarantees of that treaty."' 6 Thus, where the third state does not have
in place an adequate status determination system, there is a risk that returning or transferring a refugee to that state would involve indirect
refoulement contrary to Article 33.107

Moreover, it is insufficient for the third state to have in place an adequate determination system if it does not guarantee that a transferred
refugee will in fact have access to that system. The UNHCR noted in its
recent examination of the Dublin II Regulation that even under that
scheme, "the substance of an asylum seeker's claim is not in all cases
105.
The Michigan Guidelines conclude that "the sending state must in particular satisfy
itself that the receiving state interprets refugee status in a manner that respects the true and
autonomous meaning of the refugee definition set by Art. 1 of the Convention." Michigan
Guidelines,supra note 15, 1 4.
106.
Walter Kalin, Temporary Protectionin the EC: Refugee law, Human Rights, and the
Temptations of Pragmatism, 44 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 202, 221 (Jost Delbruck & Andreas
Zimmermann eds., 2001). In Haitian Centre for Human Rights v. United States, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights noted that, "[t]he Commission believes that international law has developed to a level at which there is recognition of a right of a person seeking
refuge to a hearing in order to determine whether that person meets the criteria in the Convention" Case No. 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.LIV/II.95, doc. 7 rev.
155 (1997). The UNHCR has consistently insisted that the third country must provide a fair
refugee status determination. Legomsky, supra note 12, at 654 n.319. See also UNHCR Advisory Opinion, supra note 60, at 3 ("As a general rule, in order to give effect to their obligations
under the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol, States will be required to grant individuals
seeking international protection access to the territory and to fair and efficient asylum procedures.").
107.
For examples of problematic state practices, see HATHAWAY, supra note 35, at 63032. This has also been an issue of concern in relation to the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country
Agreement. See Macklin, supra note 88, at 402-05 (noting that factors such as an expedited
removal procedure, a procedural one-year time limit for filing claims, and lack of legal aid for
refugee applicants in the United States mean that there is a risk of indirect refoulement when
refugees are transferred from Canada to the United States). For in-depth discussion of this
requirement, see Legomsky, supra note 12, at 654-58. This issue was also raised in the context of Australia's "Pacific Solution." Susan Kneebone notes that the procedure on Nauru for
processing claims affords "no rights to legal representation, and lawyers have been repeatedly
denied access to potential clients." Kneebone, supra note 3, at 715.
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examined in the responsible State" (the state to which a refugee is transferred),' 8 thus clearly giving rise to the possibility of indirect
refoulement. For example, the UNHCR, NGOs, and scholars have highlighted the problems in returning refugees to Greece under the Dublin
system, since many refugees are denied access to an asylum determination procedure when sent there.' °9 On this basis, successful challenges to
determinations that Greece constitutes a safe third country under the
Dublin scheme have been made in Austria, Finland, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden." ° Concerns have also been raised
with respect to other states where applicants "may find it difficult or impossible to have their cases re-opened if a decision was made in their
absence."" In addition, the UNHCR has emphasized the importance of
ensuring that an appeal or review is available in the third state against a
negative decision in order "to avoid possible serious consequences of
incorrect first instance decisions, and to ensure compliance with the
principle of non-refoulement."' 2
For this reason, in order to avoid the risk of indirect refoulement, a
state contemplating a protection elsewhere transfer must ensure that any
refugee to be transferred to a third state will have the right to enter that
state and to apply for protection under the Convention." 3 In particular,
every transfer of protection responsibility must be predicated on a commitment by the receiving state to afford the person transferred a
meaningful legal and factual opportunity to make his or her claim to protection.'" The only exception to this is where the third state will in fact
respect all Convention rights without the need for recognition of refugee
status.
B. TerritorialScope ofArticle 33
The analysis thus far has assumed that the state will act-that is, the
relevant transfer or return will be made-after a refugee has reached the
territory of a state that does not itself wish to provide protection. State
practice, however, reveals that an equally important question is whether
this analysis changes in a situation where a state wishes to transfer or
DUBLIN II, supra note 7, at 46.
Id. See also ECRE DUBLIN II, supra note 4, at 150-51.
110.
UNHCR DUBLIN II, supra note 7, at 47; ECRE DUBLIN II, supra note 4, at 151.
111.
ECRE DUBLIN II, supra note 4, at 151 (referring to Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands, Slovenia, and Spain).
112.
Id. at 50.
113.
Id. at 188. In Australia, it has been held that it is not necessary that a person have a
right of entry. ECRE has highlighted the dangers in allowing transfers where the receiving
state guarantees only that the person will have a right of entry in the receiving state but will
not have access to a refugee determination system there.
114.
Michigan Guidelines, supra note 15, $ 4.

108.
109.

UNHCR
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return a person to a third country before the refugee reaches the territory
of that state. This usually occurs as a result of a deliberate state policy to
circumvent refugee arrivals by taking action outside its territory, for example, by interdicting refugees in international waters or by exercising
control over refugees in the territory of another state. The territorial
scope of Article 33 is therefore an issue that has become significant and
controversial in international law in recent years.
Reference to the text of the Refugee Convention alone clearly suggests that Article 33 applies to state conduct wherever it may be carried
out. Unlike most of the other Convention rights discussed below, and
unlike some international human rights treaties,"' Article 33 is not conditioned on a refugee being within the territory of state parties. ' 6 Rather,
Article 33(1) simply provides that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or
return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion." The "ordinary meaning" of Article 33'17 therefore does
not include any territorial restriction; it "limits only where a refugee may
be sent 'to,' not where he may be sent from.""' 8 Further, the terms of the
article, including the proscription on refoulement carried out "in any
manner whatsoever," suggest a wide scope of application. As Justice
Blackmun of the U.S. Supreme Court noted in his dissenting opinion in
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, "[t]he terms are unambiguous. Vulner-

able refugees shall not be returned. The language is clear, and9 the
command is straightforward: that should be the end of the inquiry.""
Notwithstanding this admonition, textual arguments have been advanced against the position that Article 33 applies to extraterritorial state
conduct. The most notorious of these is embodied in the reasoning of the
U.S. Supreme Court majority in Sale,2 which concluded that the word
115.
For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights applies to
acts carried out within a state's territory and subject to its jurisdiction. International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
116.
Compare Refugee Convention, supra note 1, arts. 4, 15, 26.
117.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires that interpretation begin with the "ordinary meaning, in light of the context, object and purpose." See Vienna
Convention, supra note 24, art. 31.
118.
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 190 (1993) (Blackmun J., dissenting).
119.
Id.
120.
It should be noted that while the U.K. Court of Appeal considered Sale "wrongly
decided" and noted that it "certainly offends one's sense of fairness," in European Roma
Rights Centre v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport, [2003] 4 Eng. Rep. 247, 34 (Eng.),
the House of Lords endorsed the majority position in Sale. R (exparte European Roma Rights
Ctr.) v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport, [2004] UKHL 55, T 15-17, 43, 48, 65-72

(U.K.).
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"return" has a distinctive legal meaning that is narrower than its common
or "ordinary" meaning.' 2' This analysis is difficult to defend, given that
treaty terms are required to be interpreted according to their ordinary
meaning. 2 2 As noted by Justice Blackmun, the "ordinary meaning" of
return is "to bring, send, or put (a person or thing) back to or in a former
position.' 23 In addition, as the majority itself noted, the French refouler
(explicitly included in Article 33) means "repulse," "repel," "drive back,"
and even "expel.' ' 124 None of these understandings of the concepts of return and refouler suggest that the action need take place in any particular
territorial space.121
The second textual argument the majority put forward in Sale seeks
to limit the scope of Article 33(1) by reading it in the context of Article
33(2). 126 Article 33(2) limits the application of Article 33(1) by exempting from its protection a refugee whom "there are reasonable grounds for
regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or
who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious
crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country."' 27 The majority in Sale regarded this exemption as necessarily implying a
territorial limitation on Article 33(1) on the basis that, if Article 33(1)
were read to apply extraterritorially, "no nation could invoke the second
paragraph's exception with respect to an alien [outside its territory]: An
alien intercepted on the high seas is in no country at all." 28 This argument has also been invoked in support of the view that Article 33 does
not apply to decisions on refugee status made in embassies located in
third countries. 29 The difficulty with this argument is that it relies on a
121.
Sale, 509 U.S. at 181 (majority opinion).
122.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 31. In addition, the majority's reasoning
as to why there is a narrower "legal meaning" in the case of Article 33 is not at all clear.
123.
Sale, 509 U.S. at 191 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (citing PHILIP BABOCK GOVE, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1841 (1986)). See also HATHAWAY, supra

note 35, at 337 n.267 (citing the definition from the

CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY

15.8(a)

(9th ed. 1995): "to come or go back... [to] bring, put, or send back to the... place.., where
originally belonging").
124.
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 182 (1993) (majority opinion).
125.
This is also the view of the UNHCR in its recent opinion on this question. UNHCR
Advisory Opinion, supra note 60, at 12-13.
126.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention requires the ordinary meaning to be read "in
context," which can arguably include the other provisions of the treaty, especially in the same
article. Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 31.
127.
Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 33(2).
128.
Sale, 509 U.S. at 180.
129.
See Gregor Noll, Seeking Asylum at Embassies: A Right to Entry Under International Law?, INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 542, 554 (2005).
An extensive reading of article 33(1) CSR51 would force us to assess the security
dimension with regard to a third country (that is, the country in which the embassy
is placed) when considering whether a refugee can be denied the benefit of article
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narrow exception to a fundamental rule as itself limiting the rule,"3 a
form of inverted reasoning inconsistent with the overriding protective
and humanitarian purpose of the Refugee Convention and its most important protection embodied in Article 33.3 Further, the argument
ignores the fact that the logical reason for confining the application of
Article 33(2) to refugees within territory is that there can be no risk
posed by the presence of a refugee such as to justify refoulement3 2unless
and until the person is within the territory of the state in question.'
In addition to these textual arguments, the majority in Sale also
placed significant weight on the negotiating history of the Refugee Convention, specifically on the views of the Swiss delegate, who assumed
that Article 33 would not apply extraterritorially.13 3 However, it is questionable whether such "isolated statement[s] of a delegate to the
Convention"'34 are persuasive in this regard, particularly in light of the
specific decision of the delegates to amend Article 33 "in order to stipulate that the duty of non-refoulement prohibits return to the risk of being
33(l) CSR 51. It may very well be that a person threatens the security of that third
country, or its community, while not threatening the security of the destination
country from whose embassy she seeks protection.
Id.
As Justice Blackmun observed in Sale, "[n]onretum is the rule; the sole exception
130.
(neither applicable nor invoked here) is that a nation endangered by a refugee's very presence
may 'expel or return' him to an unsafe country if it chooses." Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,
509 U.S. 155, 194 (1993) (Blackmun J., dissenting).
131.
As the UNHCR submitted in its amicus curiae brief in Sale, in relation to the U.S.

government's arguments:
[This interpretation] extinguishes the most basic right enshrined in the treaty-the
right of non-return-for an entire class of refugees, those who have fled their own
countries but have not yet entered the territory of another State. Under [that] reading, the availability of the most fundamental protection afforded refugees turns not
on the refugee's need for protection but on his or her own ability to enter clandestinely the territory of another country.
Brief for UNHCR as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, McNary v. Haitian Centers
Council, Inc., 506 U.S. 814 (1992), reprinted in 6 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 85, 92 (1994) [hereinafter UNHCR Amicus Brief].
132.
HATHAWAY, supra note 35, at 336.
133.
Sale, 509 U.S. at 183-86 (majority opinion).
134.
Id. at 194 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In addition, the UNHCR takes the view that
the statements by the drafters relied upon by the majority in Sale
were expressions of concern related to a possible obligation to grant asylum to large
numbers of arrivals in mass influx situations. In UNHCR's view, these portions of
the negotiating history do not warrant the conclusion that the drafters of the 1951
Convention reached consensus about an implicit restriction of the territorial scope
of the principle of non-refoulement as provided for in Article 33(1).
UNHCR Advisory Opinion, supra note 60, at 13 n.57. On the contrary, the UNHCR points to
portions of the drafting history which support the opposite conclusion. Id. at 13-15.
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persecuted 'in any manner whatsoever,' said to 'refer to various methods
by which refugees could be expelled, refused admittance or removed.' "'3
A more fundamental objection to the Supreme Court's reliance on
the drafting history might be that reference to this "supplementary means
of interpretation" is only permitted "in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 3 1," or when the interpretation
according to Article 31 "leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure" or
"leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."'3 6 Such
supplementary means are not, however, permitted to create an ambiguity. 37 Arguably, the Supreme Court did not first apply the primary rule of
interpretation: to interpret the terms in accordance with their ordinary
meaning, in their context, and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. The majority acknowledged that the interpretation it adopted in
that case, which permitted interdiction on the high seas, "may even violate the spirit of Article 33, '' 38 but it did not further explore the
ramifications of that decision in terms of treaty interpretation. By contrast, reference to the humanitarian and human rights purposes of the
Refugee Convention could only confirm the conclusion that the ordinary
meaning of "return," together with the lack of territorial restriction in
on non-refoulement applies
Article 33, suggests that the prohibition
39
wherever a state acts vis-a-vis refugees.
HATHAWAY, supra note 35, at 338.
136.
Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 32.
Legomsky highlights the ambiguity created by reference to the drafters' comments
137.
in his analysis of the Sale decision, noting that "there are at least three possible interpretations
of these two delegates' comments." Stephen H. Legomsky, The USA and the CaribbeanInterdiction Program, 18 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 677, 690-91 (2006). Legomsky notes that the Swiss
delegate's comment was one of the two drafters' comments on which the Court relied in Sale.
However, as he points out, since Switzerland is a landlocked country, the notion that it was
concerned to ensure that the Refugee Convention not interfere with the Swiss navy's authority
to interdict on the high seas "stretches the Court's fertile imagination too far." Id. at 691.
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 183 (1993).
138.
The leading courts in common law jurisdictions have emphasized the human rights
139.
object and purpose of the Refugee Convention, noting that it is understood to have been "written against the background of international human rights law" (Applicant A v. Minister for
Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1996) 190 C.L.R. 225, 296-67 (Austl.); Wang v. MIMA (2000)
105 EC.R. 548, IT 74-81 (Austl.); MIMA v. Mohammed (2000) 98 EC.R. 405,421 (Austl.));
that the preamble expressly shows "that a premise of the Convention was that all human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms" (Shah v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't,
(1999) 2 A.C. 629, 639 (Lord Steyn) (U.K.)); and that the Preamble "places the Convention
among the international instruments that have as their object and purpose the protection of the
equal enjoyment by every person of fundamental rights and freedoms" (Applicant A, (1996)
190 C.L.R. at 231-32). In light of the preamble, it has been said that "[n]owhere are considerations of international instruments of human rights more important than in the area of
refugees." Premalal v. Minister for Immigration, Local Gov't & Ethnic Affairs (1993) 41
FC.R. 117, 138 (Austl.). Accordingly, common law courts have repeatedly recognized and
reiterated that "[t]his overarching and clear human rights object and purpose is the background

135.
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In light of this analysis, the better view is that Article 33 applies to
conduct that satisfies the definition of refoulement, regardless of where it
takes place.' ° In other words, unlike other Refugee Convention rights,
which restrict state action only where a specific degree of physical connection with the refugee has been achieved, Article 33 applies whenever
a state acts, regardless of the territorial basis for that exercise.
In addition to these arguments as to the specific terms and context of
the Refugee Convention, scholars sometimes rely on more general developments in international law in support of the view that the Refugee
Convention operates extraterritorially.'4 1 Contemporary international human rights law has established that a state's responsibility under human
rights treaties, while still primarily territorial, may extend to an exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Relevant treaty bodies and, more recently,
the International Court of Justice, have confirmed that "international
human rights instruments are applicable 'in respect of acts done by a
against which interpretation of individual provisions must take place." Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, 1024 (Can.). Lord Hope of
Craighead noted in In re B, R (ex parte Hoxha) v. Special Adjudicator that "[t]he social and
humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees was expressly recognised in the preamble to
the convention." [2005] UKHL 19, 6, 4 Eng. Rep. 580 (U.K.). Moreover, the UNHCR Executive Committee has confirmed the "social and humanitarian nature" of the Refugee
Convention. For example, in its Agendafor Protection, it reaffirmed state parties' commitment
to implementing the Refugee Convention obligations "fully and effectively in accordance with
the [humanitarian] object and purpose" of the Refugee Convention. U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR
REFUGEES, ExCOM, AGENDA FOR PROTECTION
1-3, (Oct. 2003), available at http://
www.unhcr.bg/pubs/agenda-protection/en/agenda-for-_protection-en.pdf. In terms of the
specific issue of non-refoulement, the ExCom has noted that "[g]iven the practice of States to
intercept persons at great distance from their own territory, the international refugee protection
regime would be rendered ineffective if States' agents abroad were free to act at variance with
obligations under international refugee law and human rights law." U.N. High Comm'r for
Refugees, Interception of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: The International Framework and
Recommendationsfor a Comprehensive Approach, 23, U.N. Doc. EC/50/SC/CRP. 17 (June 9,
2000).
140.
It is noteworthy that the UNHCR also endorses this view. UNHCR Amicus Brief,
supra note 131. In its 2000 ExCom note, the UNHCR stated, "[t]he principle of nonrefoulement does not imply any geographical limitation. In UNHCR's understanding, the
resulting obligations extend to all government agents acting in an official capacity, within or
outside national territory." U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, ExCom, Interception of AsylumSeekers and Refugees: The InternationalFramework and Recommendationsfor a Comprehensive Approach, T 23, U.N. Doc. EC/50/SC/CRP.17 (June 19, 2000). See also Haitian Centre
for Human Rights v. United States, Case No. 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 51/96,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. $ 157 (1997). The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights' jurisdiction to consider this issue is indirect in that it has jurisdiction to interpret Article XXVII of the American Declaration, which in turn requires that any right to seek asylum
must be "in accordance with international agreements," thus requiring consideration of the
scope of the Refugee Convention.
141.
Note that a treaty is not to be read in a vacuum, but rather must be interpreted taking into account "any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties." Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 31 (3)(c).
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State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory.' ,,042 However, while this interpretation has expanded the potential liability of
states to encompass acts that occur outside their territory, the requirement that the acts be within state jurisdiction has proven to be a hurdle to
establishing state responsibility in some contexts, as jurisdiction requires
something more than mere action.14 Reference to these developments
may therefore suggest a similarly restrictive approach to establishing
state responsibility in the context of Article 33.'44 The question is
whether it is necessary to establish that a state has acted outside territory
but within its jurisdiction in order to establish state responsibility under
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention.
Reference to the relevant jurisprudence of international human rights
courts and tribunals makes clear that the reason jurisdiction must be established in this context is that the relevant treaties explicitly apply only
to an exercise of state jurisdiction. 4 1 Since a state is responsible for acts
142.
Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, 1216 (Dec. 19) (summarizing the ICJ's decision in the
Construction of a Wall case); See also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 179 (July 9). This
recent affirmation of Construction of a Wall is important because some have raised doubts
about how far the ICJ actually went in that case. See, e.g., Michael J. Dennis, Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Construction of a Wall in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory:Application of
Human Rights Treaties Extraterritoriallyin Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation,
99 Am. J. INT'L L. 119, 123 (2005) ("Arguably the best reading of the Court's opinion is that
is was based only on the view that the West Bank and Gaza were part of the "territory" of
Israel for purposes of the application of the Covenant.").
143.
As Ralph Wilde notes:
[The relevant adjudicatory bodies] do not conceive state responsibility simply in
terms of the acts of parties, as is the case, for example, in Article 1 of the third Geneva Convention... in which contracting parties undertake "to respect and to ensure
respect for the present Convention in all circumstances." Instead, responsibility is
conceived in a particular context: the State's jurisdiction.
Ralph Wilde, Legal "Black Hole"? ExtraterritorialState Action and InternationalTreaty Law
on Civil and Political Rights, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 739, 795 (2005). See, e.g., Bankovic et al.
v. Belgium (2001) 11 B.H.R.C. 435; R (AI-Skeini) v. Sec'y of State for Defence [2005]
EWCA (Civ) 1609.
144.
Indeed, a number of scholars automatically assume that it is necessary to establish
"jurisdiction" in the refugee context. See, e.g., Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 60, at
110. Gregor Noll, however, objects to reliance on these parallel developments as supporting an
expansive view of Article 33 on the basis that "human rights treaty law shows significant
variations in the precise formulations delimiting the applicability of single instruments," and
thus it is "not correct to state that human rights treaty law is applicable ratione loci wherever
the jurisdiction of a state extends." Noll, supra note 129, at 552.
145.
Indeed, the cases concerning the application of the European Convention on Human
Rights make it clear that that is the reason for referring to this issue. See, e.g., AI-Skeini,
[2005] EWCA (Civ) 1609, [3]. See also Construction of a Wall, in which the ICJ explained:
The scope of application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
is defined by Article 2, paragraph 1, thereof, which provides:
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that constitute violations of the international obligations of the state,' 46 it is
necessary to ascertain the scope of any legal obligation in order to assess
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
This provision can be interpreted as covering only individuals who are both present
within a State's territory and subject to that State's jurisdiction. It can also be construed as covering both individuals present within a State's territory and those
outside that territory but subject to that State's jurisdiction. The Court will thus seek
to determine the meaning to be given to this text.
2004 I.C.J. 136, 178-79.
Further, disagreement amongst commentators as to the legitimacy of the extension of
these treaties to extraterritorial acts focuses on the question whether the language of "jurisdiction" found within the treaties allows such an extension. These issues have proved most
controversial in the context of the ICCPR, given that it specifically applies to acts carried out
within a state's territory and subject to its jurisdiction. The Human Rights Committee has
essentially read this to apply to acts occurring either within territory or where a person is
within the "power or effective control" of the state party, even if not within territory. See U.N.
Human Rights Comm. (HRC), General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (ICCPR), 1 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2I/Rev.I/
Add.13 (2004) [hereinafter General Comment 31]. Michael Dennis is particularly critical of
the HRC's approach (endorsed by the ICJ in Construction of a Wall) on the basis, inter alia,
that it has "abandoned the literal reading altogether." Dennis, supra note 142, at 122. See also
Noll, supra note 129, at 563--64. However, as Manfred Nowak points out, "[a]n excessively
literal reading" of Article 2(1) would "lead to often absurd results." MANFRED NOWAK, U.N.
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 43 (2d rev. ed. 2005). A
similar observation was made by HRC Member Mr. Tomusschat in a concurring opinion in
U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. R12/52: Burgos v. Uruguay, No. 52/79, U.N. Doc.
Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40), at 176 (1981), cited in THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 90 (Sarah Joseph et al. eds.,
2d ed. 2000). For example, Dennis's view that the ICCPR only applies to individuals "both
within its territory and subject to its sovereign authority" (Dennis, supra note 142, at 122)
would render Article 12(4) nugatory, because nationals prevented from entering their country
of nationality would be unable to rely on it since they would not be in the territory of a state
party. NOWAK, supra, at 43. Thus, Nowak emphasizes that "[a]n interpretation that seeks to
take into account the purpose of this awkwardly formulated provision must aim at the responsibility of States under international law." Id. at 41-42 (emphasis in original). He notes that
the HRC has accordingly "sought to correct the wording of this provision by developing case
law oriented along the object and purpose of the Covenant and affording increased legal protection" Id. at 44. Thus, for example, he notes that when state parties "take actions on foreign
territory that violate the rights of persons subject to their sovereign authority, it would be
contrary to the purpose of the Covenant if they could not be held responsible." Id. at 42. It
should be noted that Dennis's argument in relation to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights is even weaker, because in the absence of any limiting provision in
the treaty itself, his only argument is that "[t]he negotiating record does not even suggest that
states intended that the substantive obligations in the ICESCR would apply extraterritorially."
Dennis, supra note 142, at 126.
Int'l Law Comm'n, Articles on State Responsibility, art. 2, G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex,
146.
U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter ILC Articles].
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state responsibility. Where the relevant legal obligation (under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or the
European Convention) applies only to an exercise of state jurisdiction,47
then clearly jurisdiction is required to establish state responsibility.
However, in the case of a treaty obligation that is not explicitly restricted
to acts within the jurisdiction of the state-such as Article 33 of the
Refugee Convention-a state commits an internationally wrongful act
when conduct consisting of an act or omission "[c]onstitutes a breach of
an international obligation of the State." 48 Thus, any conduct amounting
to direct or indirect refoulement by a state, wherever carried out, implicates the international responsibility of that state for a violation of
Article 33. On this understanding, there is no further requirement to establish that the act or omission amounting to refoulement was carried out
within the state's jurisdiction.
However, even if we accept that it is necessary to establish jurisdiction in order to enliven Article 33, reference to the developing human
rights jurisprudence on jurisdiction suggests that most extraterritorial
acts relevant to the refugee context will fall within its ambit. The consistent view under human rights law is that a state exercises jurisdiction
when it wields "effective control" over territory or persons. 9 Ralph
Wilde characterizes the two relevant contexts as "spatial" and "personal"
jurisdiction." 0 As to the first, Wilde explains that jurisdiction "amounts
to asserting control over a particular territorial space."' 5 ' As explained by
the ECHR in the Bankovic case, this can occur where a state, "through
the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad,
There is variation in the specific scope of the key international human rights trea147.
ties, but they almost all make some reference to this issue. For example, while the ICCPR
applies to persons "within [a state party's] territory and subject to its jurisdiction," ICCPR,
supra note 115, art. 2(1), the Convention on the Rights of the Child applies to each child
"within [a state party's] jurisdiction," Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 2(1), Nov.
20, 1989), 1577 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter CRC], and the ECHR applies to "jurisdiction," European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1 Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, amended by Protocol No. 11, May 11, 1994, 155 E.T.S. 1. The
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) contains no specific territorial or jurisdictional limitation. ICESCR, Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
148.
ILC Articles, supra note 146, art. 2(b).
149.
See. e.g., HRC General Comment 31, supra note 145, 10 ("[A] State party must
respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party.")
(emphasis added). Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, after reviewing the authorities, conclude even
more broadly that there is a "general proposition that persons will come within the jurisdiction
of a State in circumstances in which they can be said to be under the effective control of that
State or are affected by those acting on behalf of the State more generally, wherever this occurs." Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 60, at I11.
150.

See generally Wilde, supra note 143.

151.

Id. at 798.
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as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory exercises all or
some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government."'' 2 In refugee law, this type of jurisdiction may be exercised, for
example, when one state permits another state to operate some kind of
extraterritorial processing center (possibly including detention) on its
territory.'53 On this basis, it could be argued that Australia's obligation to
respect Article 33 clearly pertained to its involvement
in the confinement
54
and processing of refugee claimants in Nauru.'
The second context in which a state can be said to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction is where, regardless of whether the area "in which the
control is exercised is itself under the State's control,"' 5 there is a relationship of "power ...control/effective control ... or authority between
the State and the individual, quite apart from a relationship of control
56
operating with respect to the territory in which the acts take place."'
152.
Bankovic et. al v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, para. 71 (Grand Chamber,
Admissibility Decision), quoted by Wilde, supra note 143, at 800.
153.
Of course this would depend on the degree of control exercised by the relevant
state. Noll, supra note 3, at 326.
154.
The Memorandum of Understanding signed by Australia with Nauru obliged Australia to "ensure that each person will be processed and have departed Nauru within as short a
time as is reasonably possible, and that no persons will be left behind in Nauru*" Ruhani v.
Dir. of Police (2005) 222 C.L.R. 489, 49 (Austl.). Australian immigration officials therefore
determined refugee applications in Nauru. See also Kneebone, supra note 3, at 709-15. Moreover, under the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding,
[Australia undertook] to provide the facilities in Nauru in which detainees such as
the appellant were housed. It undertook to provide security personnel for such facilities, as well as health and medical services. Pursuant to these undertakings, the
Australian Protective Service stationed approximately twenty-three officers in
Nauru. They supported the Nauru Police Force and were appointed reserve officers
of that force.
Ruhani (2005) 222 CL.R. 489, 51.
155.
Bankovic, 200 1-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, para. 71, quoted in Wilde, supra note 143, at
800.
156.
Wilde, supra note 143, at 802 n.141. One example is provided by the decision of
the ECHR in Ocalan v. Turkey. The Court noted:
[Tlhe applicant was arrested by members of the Turkish security forces inside an
aircraft in the international zone of Nairobi Airport. Directly after he had been
handed over by the Kenyan officials to the Turkish officials the applicant was under
effective Turkish authority and was therefore brought within the "jurisdiction" of
that State . .. even though in this instance Turkey exercised its authority outside its
territory.
Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R. 125, para. 93 (Grand Chamber,
Judgment on the Merits) (cited in Wilde, supra note 143, at 803). In Construction of a Wall,
the ICJ affirmed the HRC jurisprudence on point: "[tihe constant practice of the Human
Rights Committee is consistent with this [extraterritorial application of the ICCPR]." Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
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The rationale for establishing jurisdiction and thus state responsibility on
this basis is explained by the ECHR in Issa and Others v. Turkey:
A State may also be held accountable for violation of the Convention rights and freedoms of persons who are in the territory
of another State but who are found to be under the former State's
authority and control through its agents operating-whether lawfully or unlawfully-in the latter State ....Accountability in
such situations stems from the fact that Article 1 of the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a state party to
perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of 57another state, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory.
In refugee law, it could therefore be argued that any time a state seizes
the power or authority over a refugee to determine her destination,'58
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 179 (July 9). Thus, the Committee has found the Covenant applicable where the state exercises its jurisdiction on foreign territory. It has ruled on the legality of
acts by Uruguay in cases of arrests carried out by Uruguayan agents in Brazil or Argentina.
See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. R.12/52: Burgos v. Uruguay, U.N. Doc. Supp.
No. 40 (A/36/40) at 176 (1981); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. R.13/56: Lilian
Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) at 185 (1981). It decided to the same effect in the case of the confiscation of a passport by a Uruguayan consulate
in Germany. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 106/1981: Montero v. Uruguay,
109, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/38/40) at 186 (1983).
157.
Issa and Others v. Turkey, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. 629, paras. 71-72 (footnotes omitted
and emphasis added). This echoes similar pronouncements by the Human Rights Committee. As
the HRC noted in De Lopez v. Uruguay, "it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the
Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own
territory." U.N. Human Rights Comm., Case no. 52/1979, De Lopez v. Uruguay, 12.3, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/OR/I (1985). In a concurring opinion, Committee Member Tomuschat concluded:
"[n]ever was it envisaged, however, to grant States parties unfettered discretionary power to carry
out willful and deliberate attacks against the freedom and personal integrity of their citizens
living abroad. Consequently, despite the wording of article 2(1), the events which took place
outside Uruguay come within the purview of the Covenant." Id. at 560 (emphasis added). Indeed,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has explained that the notion that the Commission's jurisdiction will under certain circumstances be exercised "over acts with an extraterritorial locus will not only be consistent with, but requiredby, the norms which pertain [in the
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man 19481." Coard et al. v. United States,
Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.LIV/IH.106, doc. 6 rev. 37 (1999)
(emphasis added). Similarly, in Constructionof a Wall, the ICJ noted:
The Court would observe that, while the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it
may sometimes be exercised outside the national territory. Considering the object and
purpose of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it would seem
natural that, even when such is the case, States parties to the Covenant should be
bound to comply with its provisions.
2004 I.C.J. at 179.
158.
One example is where the state seeks to return a person to his country of origin or
to a third country that may in turn remove him to his country of origin.
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whether this occurs on the high seas or in the territory of another state,
Article 33 is implicated.5 9
C. The Scope of State Responsibility Pursuantto Article 33
In addition to its responsibility for expulsions or returns carried out
directly, whether within territory or extraterritorially, a state is responsible for violations of Article 33 that are attributable to it under
international law.' 6° The most obvious conduct attributable to a state is that
carried out by "any State organ," whether the organ "exercises legislative,
executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the
organization of the State."' 6' It is irrelevant that the state organ may have
acted in excess of authority or in contravention of its instructions. ' Thus,
where a state, for example, sends its immigration department officials to

another state to process refugee claims or to otherwise exercise authority
for any violations of Article 33
over refugee claimants, it is 6responsible
3
officials.'
such
by
committed

By contrast, Noll argues that "a high degree of sovereign control" is "inherently
159.
demanded" by the terms "expel or return (refouler)." Thus, he argues, "the terms 'expel' and
'refouler' in article 33 CSR suggest a direct sovereign relationship between the removing
agent and the territory from which removal takes place." Noll, supra note 129, at 555. However, this is inconsistent with the settled view that a state may exercise personal jurisdiction,
absent territorial sovereignty, as outlined above. Moreover, it is directly refuted by the decision of the U.K. Court of Appeal in "B" v. Secy of State for Foreign & Commonwealth
Affairs. [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1344, (Eng.), available at http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/
judgmentsfiles/j2837/b-v-secretaryofstate.htm, in which the Court of Appeal considered
whether the United Kingdom's jurisdiction under the European Convention was enlivened by
the decision of its consular staff in Melbourne not to grant the applicants protection under the
constructive non-refoulement aspect of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. The Court noted that the ECHR in WM v. Denmark had held that the acts of the Danish Ambassador in that case "constituted an exercise of authority over the applicant to an
extent sufficient to bring him within the jurisdiction of the Danish authorities." "B" v. Sec 'y of
State, [2004] EWCA (Civ) at [64]. Although the actions of the British staff in "B" v. Secretary
of State indicated less control over the applicants than had been the case in WM, the Court of
Appeal was "content to assume (without reaching a positive conclusion on the point) that
while in the consulate the applicants were sufficiently within the authority of the consular staff
to be subject to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for the purpose of Article 1 [of the
European Convention]." Id. at [66] (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR). The key point is
that there was no question that the actions of the consular staff were capable of amounting to
an exercise of jurisdiction; rather, the issue was whether the facts in that case gave rise to a
finding of effective control.
Michigan Guidelines, supra note 15, T 7.
160.
ILC Articles, supra note 146, art. 4(1). See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, THE IN161.
TERNATIONAL
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INTRODUCTION,

94 (2002).
supra note 161, at 106.

TEXT AND COMMENTARIES

162.

CRAWFORD,

An example is the practice of Australia in sending its immigration officials to de163.
termine refugee status claims on Nauru. See Kneebone, supra note 3, at 715.
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A state is also responsible for the conduct of a person or entity which
is not an organ of the state, but which is empowered by the law of that

state to exercise elements of governmental authority.' 64 In the refugee
context, this could apply to acts amounting to refoulement carried out by

private or state-owned airlines that may have delegated to them powers
in relation to immigration, 6 1 or to private security firms contracted to
operate refugee detention facilities (inside or outside the state) or facili-

tate the removal of refugee claimants. Conduct of private persons or
entities is also attributable to the state where a person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of,67or under the direction or
control of, a state in carrying out the conduct.
Where two or more states act collectively with regard to refugees,
they may be jointly responsible for the same internationally wrongful
act. The responsibility of each state may be invoked and is not "diminished or reduced by the fact that one or more other States are also

responsible for the same act.' 68 Thus, for example, where two or more
states enter into an agreement to participate jointly in the processing of
refugee claims, they are each responsible for violations of Article 33 carried out pursuant to that agreement.' 69 In addition, the conduct of "an

organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State shall be considered an act of the former State under international law if the organ is
acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the
State at whose disposal it is placed."' 70 This may be especially relevant
164.

ILC Articles, supra note 146, art. 5. CRAWFORD, supra note 161, at 100.
CRAWFORD, supra note 161, at 100.
166.
The ILC Commentary provides an example of private security firms in the context
of this article. CRAWFORD, supra note 161, at 100. Lauterpacht and Bethlehem similarly note
that the responsibility of states under Article 33 extends to "circumstances in which organs of
other States, private undertakings (such as carriers, agents responsible for checking documentation in transit, etc.) or other persons act on behalf of a Contracting State or in exercise of
governmental activity of that State." Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 60, at 87. In such
situations, as Hathaway notes, "an act which would amount to an exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction is no less so because it is committed by an entity (for example, a private corporation) under contract with a government than if committed directly by officials of the state
party itself." HATHAWAY, supra note 35, at 340. A relevantexample is the situation in Nauru,
whereby Kneebone explains that, "[clamp security was managed by a private company, Chubb
Protection Services, based on a protocol signed by Nauru Police Force, the IOM and Australian Protectorate Service (APS)." Kneebone, supra note 3, at 709.
167.
ILC Articles, supra note 146, art. 8. For an analysis of the meaning of "direction or
control," see CRAWFORD, supra note 161, at 110-13. This could pertain to Australia's agreement with Nauru, since "the Australian government funded and directed the Pacific
'protection' centres...." Kneebone, supra note 3, at 710. However, a final conclusion on this
point would involve closer analysis.
168.
ILC Articles, supra note 146, art. 47. CRAWFORD, supra note 161, at 272.
169.
Noll notes that this may be the case in proposals of the U.K. and Danish government regarding "Transit Processing Centres" or "Protection Zones." Noll, supra note 3, at 326.
170.
ILC Articles, supra note 146, art. 6.

165.
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where the officials in a transit country exercise authority over refugees
on behalf of another state (for example, the state to which the refugees
were intending to travel).' 7' In such circumstances, the fact that the transit country is not a party to the Refugee Convention is not relevant to the
responsibility of the destination state party. Where the destination state is
a party to the Convention, it is responsible for acts in violation of Article
33 that72 are committed by the organs of the transit state acting at its disposal.

Apart from conduct that is attributable to the state under international law, a state may be responsible for the commission of an
internationally wrongful act where it "aids or assists another State in the
commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter."'' 73 It is necessary to establish that the state "does so with knowledge of the
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act," and that "the act
would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State."'' 74 Thus,
where one state party to the Refugee Convention knowingly assists another state party to return refugees to a state in which they fear
persecution, the first state may be responsible for the violation of Article
33 of the Convention, even if 75the act amounting to refoulement was not
itself carried out by that state.1
V. RESPECT FOR REFUGEE RIGHTS BEYOND ARTICLE 33
Although states seeking to invoke the protection elsewhere concept-and many scholars critiquing the practice-frequently focus on
Article 33 as the only "protection obligation" that must be respected in
the third state before removal is permitted, the Refugee Convention in
fact imposes a range of other obligations on state parties. A number of
commentators, including some scholars and domestic law judges, have
expressed the view that a state may only send a refugee to a third state
HATHAWAY, supra note 35, at 340.
171.
This is especially important in the context of recent "protection elsewhere" policies
172.
instituted by Australia, in which agreements have been made with transit countries such as
Indonesia which are not parties to the Convention. Savitri Taylor notes that under the "regional
cooperation arrangement," which Australia entered into in 2000, "asylum seekers are prevented by Indonesian authorities from leaving Indonesia but are provided accommodation,
food and emergency medical care by IOM (at Australia's expense)." Taylor, supra note 3, at
295. In order to assess whether Indonesian officials could be said to be acting "at the disposal"
of Australia, one would need to take into account this Memorandum of Understanding (not a
public document) and its implementation. See generally id.
ILC Articles, supra note 146, art. 16.
173.
Id.
174.
An example would be where State A finances State B's interdiction program, but
175.
does not itself carry out the returns.
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where she will be granted protection "comparable" or "equivalent" to
that to which she is entitled in the first state, including all obligations
imposed by the Refugee Convention. However, the legal basis for re176.
Such views can be found in some individual judgments in the Australian case law
on "effective protection." See, e.g., Al-Rahal v. MIMA (2001) 100 EC.R. 73, 78 (Austl.) (Lee,
J., dissenting) (noting that the Refugee Convention affords refugees a range of rights in addition to non-refoulment). He then stated, "as far as the operation of the Treaty is concemed
under international law, equivalentprotection to that requiredof a ContractingState under the
Treaty must be secured to an applicant in a third country before it can be said that person is
not a refugee requiring consideration under the Treaty." Id. at 89 (emphasis added). In WAGH
v. MIMA (2003) 131 F.C.R. 269, Judge Lee noted:
It may be consonant with the terms of the Convention, or with international law, for
Australia to provide that protection obligations under the Convention do not arise in
respect of a refugee in Australia where that person has an established right to enter
and reside in a country that has accepted that person as a person to whom protection
is to be provided, equivalent to that required of a Contracting State under the Convention. However, it is the Minister's submission that [the domestic legislation]
contemplates that a refugee within the territory of Australia is liable to be removed
from Australia to another country without recognition by that country of that person's need for protection. Such a construction would purport to transfer to the other
country Australia's duties and responsibilities under the Convention in respect of a
refugee in its territory and would not meet Australia's obligations under international law and, in particular, as a Contracting State under the Convention.
Id. at 278-79 (emphasis added). Also significant is the fact that the High Court of Australia
recognized in NAGV of 2002 v. Ministerfor Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
(2005) 213 A.L.R. 668 (Austl.), that a range of refugee rights beyond Article 33 are pertinent
to the "safe third country" concept in Australian domestic law. The judgment explained that
"there is a range of requirements imposed upon Contracting States with respect to refugees
some of which can fairly be characterised as 'protection obligations.' Free access to courts of
law (Art. 16(1)), temporary admission to refugee seamen (Art. 11), and the measure of religious freedom provided by Art. 4 are examples." Id. 31. In Ammur v. France, the European
Court of Human Rights noted, in considering an argument that the respondent government did
not deprive the applicants of their liberty when detaining them in the international zone of the
Paris-Orly Airport (thus preventing them from making a refugee claim), that
[t]he mere fact that it is possible for asylum-seekers to leave voluntarily the country
where they wish to take refuge cannot exclude a restriction on liberty, the right to
leave any country, including one's own, being guaranteed, moreover, by Protocol
No. 4 to the Convention. Furthermore, this possibility becomes theoretical if no
other country offering protection comparable to the protection they expect to find in
the country where they are seeking asylum is inclined or prepared to take them in.
1996-HI1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 827, 850 (emphasis added). See also Jens Vedsted-Hansen, Nonadmission policies and the right to protection: refugees' choice versus states' exclusion?, in
REFUGEE RIGHTS AND REALITIES

269, 279 (Frances Nicholson & Patrick Twomey eds.,

1999). Vedsted-Hansen argues that:
Taking into account the content and structure of the Geneva Convention, as well as
the declaratory nature of the determination of refugee status, it must follow that, in
order to be considered an adequate country of first asylum, the relevant state has to
provide refugee protection of a quality, and at a level, in conformity with the protection scheme laid down in the Convention.
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quiring such comparable or equivalent protection in the third state has
not always been clearly articulated.'77 This Part therefore considers the
basis for imposing constraints on state parties beyond Article 33 of the
Refugee Convention. The primary focus is on the full range of rights set
out in the Refugee Convention, but other international legal obligations
will also be examined briefly.
It is important to note at the outset that the following analysis assesses the legitimacy of state action in transferring refugees to a third
state by reference to the international obligations of the sending state. A
preliminary question might arise as to whether there is any basis for also
constraining a state wishing to transfer refugees to a third state by reference to the international obligations of the third state. In other words,
should the sending state be prohibited from sending refugees to a third
state where it is likely that the third state will violate its international
obligations in its treatment of such refugees (even if the sending state is
not itself bound by the relevant obligations)?
The general position in international law is that each state is responsible for its own wrongful conduct, so the notion of holding a state
accountable for the internationally wrongful conduct of another state is
exceptional. 1 8 In such "exceptional cases," one state "should assume responsibility for the internationally wrongful conduct of another."' 79 Of
the possible bases for such responsibility outlined in the International
Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, the only relevant
provision is the "aid and assist" doctrine encapsulated in Article 16 of
the Articles, which provides that:
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of
an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:
(a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of
the internationally wrongful act; and
(b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by
that State.'80
Id. See also Gil-Bazo, supra note 13, at 599 ("[T]he transfer of responsibility from a State to
another State, even admitting that such State be a 'safe third country,' raises issues of State
responsibility to fulfill all the obligations towards refugees under international refugee and
human rights law that have been engaged by its exercise of jurisdiction.").
As Legomsky ightly notes, "[h]ow the various Convention rights should affect the
177.
formulation of criteria for the return of asylum seekers to third countries is probably the single
most difficult issue addressed [in his paper]." Legomsky, supra note 12, at 640.
178.
CRAWFORD, supra note 161, at 145.
Id. at 146.
179.
180.
ILC Articles, supra note 146, art. 16.
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Although this doctrine provides a mechanism for holding one state
responsible for the actions of another, it is important to note that it only
applies where the aiding/assisting state is itself bound by the relevant
international legal obligation.' 8 ' This is because of the basic principle
that "a State is not bound by obligations of another State,"'82 and thus, "a
State is free to act for itself in a way which is inconsistent with obligations of another State."'83 Since Article 16 only applies where both the
sending (aiding/assisting) state and the destination state are parties to the
Refugee Convention or other relevant human rights instruments, it does
not provide an additional basis for assessing the responsibility of a state
that wishes to transfer refugees from its jurisdiction to a third state. For
this reason, the international legal obligations of the sending state should
always provide the basis for assessing constraints on that state's actions
in this context." Accordingly, the remainder of this Part now considers
the basis for holding the sending state accountable pursuant to its own

181.
Id. art. 16(b).
182.
CRAWFORD, supra note 161, at 149; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 24,
arts. 34-35.
183.
CRAWFORD, supra note 161, at 149.
184.
For this reason, the Michigan Guidelines do not adopt the "complicity principle,"
developed by Legomsky, as the fact that this principle relies on Article 16 of the ILC Articles
and the terminology of "complicity" implies that one is concerned with the assessment of the
sending state's responsibility by reference to the obligationsof the destination state. Michigan
Guidelines, supra note 15. According to the "aid and assist" doctrine, a state is accountable in
international law if it aids or assists another state in the commission of an unlawful act by the
latter, implying that an essential step in ascertaining liability is to assess whether the third
state has violated an international obligation to which it is subject. This is made clear in the
ILC Commentary to Article 16. CRAWFORD, supra note 161, at 148-51. Legomsky supports
this approach, explaining that the first state is responsible because "[t]he delivery of the refugee into the hands of the second state has obviously facilitated the latter state's violation of
international law." Legomsky, supra note 12, at 621. Since Article 13 of the ILC Articles provides that "[a]n act of a State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless
the State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs," it would be necessary to establish that the third state is a party to relevant human rights agreements, including
the Refugee Convention. Thus, according to the complicity principle, we would first assess
whether the third state is likely to be in violation of an international obligation to which it is
subject and then determine whether the first state has knowingly aided or assisted in that violation by sending a refugee to that state.
However there is a problem with assessing state responsibility for transfer decisions on
this basis: if, in order to establish complicity, it is first necessary to establish that in failing to
uphold human rights obligations the third state will itself be in violation of an international
obligation, then the "sending state" can circumvent liability by ensuring that it transfers refugees to a state which is not a party to the Refugee Convention or any other international
human rights treaty. This is because, according to the 'International Law Commission, "[t]he
wrongfulness of the aid or assistance given by the former is dependent, inter alia, on the
wrongfulness of the conduct of the latter." CRAWFORD, supra note 161, at 151. If the destination state is not bound by relevant international agreements, the sending state cannot be
responsible for "aiding and assisting" that state.
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obligations for treatment the refugee applicant will encounter in the third
state.
A. Refugee Convention

Although, as mentioned above, states often assert that Article 33 is
the only relevant constraint on their ability to transfer refugees under a
protection elsewhere policy, the Convention imposes a number of other
important human rights obligations on states. 85' Some of these obligations apply as soon as the refugee is within the territory of a contracting
state (and some even prior to that stage, as discussed above).'8 6 This is so
even if state agencies have not yet determined that the applicant satisfies
the refugee definition, since it is well established that recognition of
refugee status is declaratory only.'87 As soon as a refugee is within the
territory of a state, the state incurs obligations to that refugee under Article 3 (nondiscrimination), Article 4 (religion), Article 13 (movable and
immovable property), Article 16(1) (access to the courts), Article 20 (rationing), Article 22 (education), Article 25 (administrative assistance),
Article 27 (identity papers), Article 29 (fiscal charges), Article 31 (1) (nonpenalization for illegal entry or presence), Article 31(2) (freedom from
constraints on movement unless shown to be necessary and justifiable),
Article 33 (protection against refoulement) and Article 34 (consideration

185.

Moreover, as Judge Lee of the Australian Federal Court has noted,

The Convention does not provide that the incurring of obligations to a refugee to
whom the Convention applies is at the option or discretion of a Contracting State
and nor does it provide that a Contracting State will not incur obligations to a refugee under the Convention if the refugee has had, or has, the opportunity to seek
protection from another country or Contracting State.
WAGH v. MIMA (2003) 131 F.C.R. 269, 276.
See supra Sections IV.B and IV.C.
186.
This is clear from the terms of the definition. Rather than providing that a refugee is
187.
a person recognized to meet the definition, it merely provides that a refugee is a person who,
"owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country." Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. I A(2). The declaratory nature of the definition is made clear in the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status. U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES

28, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/Eng/REV. I (re-

vised 1992) (1979). It has also been reiterated in UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No. 6, which
emphasizes "the fundamental importance of the principle of non-refoulement ... of persons
who may be subjected to persecution if returned to their country of origin irrespective of
whether or not they have been formally recognized as refugees." (XXVIII) "Nonrefoulement" T (c) (1977), cited in UNHCR Advisory Opinion, supra note 60, at 2-3 n.9.
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for naturalization).' 8 As a refugee's connection with a state strengthens,
that state incurs further obligations.'89
The question is whether a state party can remove a refugee to whom
obligations have been incurred under the Refugee Convention to a third
state in which all or some of these rights will not be respected, because
the other state is not a party to the Refugee Convention, because it has
entered reservations with respect to some specific rights or because, despite being a party to the Convention, it does not in fact respect them. '9°
The basic question, therefore, is whether a state party to a human rights
treaty (such as the Refugee Convention) can transfer its obligations to
another state and thereby avoid liability under the treaty.
The answer is that a state cannot "contract out" of its international
legal obligations or transfer responsibility for such obligations to another
state. In particular, removal or transfer of a person from the territory or
jurisdiction of one state to another does not also transfer legal obligations to that other state. This was made clear by the ECHR in its decision
in TI v. United Kingdom, a case concerning the United Kingdom's intention to transfer a Sri Lankan man to Germany under the Dublin
Convention, when there was a real risk that Germany would subsequently return him to Sri Lanka contrary to Article 3 of the European
Convention. The Court found "that the indirect removal ...to an intermediary country which is also a Contracting State does not affect the
responsibility of the United Kingdom to ensure that the applicant is not,
as a result of its decision to expel him, exposed to treatment contrary to
Article 3 of the Convention."' 9' The Court continued:
Where States establish international organizations, or mutatis
mutandis international agreements, to pursue co-operation in
certain fields of activities, there may be implications for the protection of fundamental rights. It would be incompatible with the
purpose and object of the Convention if Contracting States were
thereby absolved from their responsibility under the Convention
92
in relation to the field of activity covered by such attribution.'

HATHAWAY, supra note 35, at 160-73.
189.
See generally id. at 657-905. For example, once a refugee is "lawfully present" (a
status different from merely being present), he acquires protection from expulsion, freedom of
residence and internal movement, and the right to self-employment. Refugee Convention,
supra note 1,arts. 32, 31, 18 (respectively). Further, once a refugee is "lawfully staying," he
acquires further rights, including the right to wage-earning employment. Id. art. 17.
190.
See supra Section III.B for consideration of the question of whether formal accession is required.
191.
T.I. v. The United Kingdom, 2000-11I Eur. Ct. H.R. 435,456-57.
192.
Id. (citing Waite & Kennedy v. Germany, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 393, 410).

188.

Winter 2007]

ProtectionElsewhere

Accordingly, even where the United Kingdom transferred a person to
Germany, the transfer did not extinguish its obligation to ensure that the
removal would
not result in a violation of Article 3 of the European
93
Convention. 1
This reasoning applies afortiori to the Refugee Convention. In contrast to general international human rights treaties, 194 the Refugee
Convention's purpose is to impose obligations on states regarding a specific group of persons in special need of protection.' 95 While the
193.
See also Section V.B for the jurisprudence regarding other articles of the European
Convention and other treaties. Importantly, it is clear in this context that the focus remains on
the sending state's obligations. It is clear that a state is in violation of its own primary obligation under relevant human rights treaties if it removes a person to another country in which
she will be subjected to treatment which amounts to a violation of the relevant treaty provision. This is illustrated in the judgment in Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1989)--one of the earliest ECHR judgments on point. In that case, the United Kingdom
was held responsible for treatment to be carried out in a state not party to the ECHR. However, by extraditing Soeing to that country, the United Kingdom was held in breach of Article
3 of the European Convention (to which it was a party). This has also been made clear in other
decisions by the ECHR. See, e.g., Cruz Varas v. Sweden, App. No. 15576/89, 14 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 1, 69 (1991). The European Commission on Human Rights explains:
Although the establishment of such responsibility involves an assessment of conditions in the requesting country against the standards of Article 3, there is no
question of adjudicating on or establishing the responsibility of the receiving country, whether under general international law, under the Convention or otherwise. In
so far as any liability under the Convention is or may be incurred, it is liability incurred by the extraditing Contracting State by reason of its having taken action
which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed illtreatment.
Id. This is also Crawford's understanding. See CRAWFORD, supra note 161, at 145 ("In certain
circumstances the wrongfulness of a State's conduct may depend on the independent action of
another State. A State may engage in conduct in a situation where another State is involved
and the conduct of the other State may be relevant or even decisive in assessing whether the
first State has breached its own internationalobligations.") (emphasis added). Crawford then
goes on to discuss the Soering analysis as an example of this point. This was also made clear
from the earliest HRC decision on point, Kindler v. Canada, in which the HRC explained, "if
a State party takes a decision relating to a person within its jurisdiction, and the necessary and
foreseeable consequence is that that person's rights under the Convention will be violated in
another jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in violation of the Covenant." U.N. Human
Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 470/91, 6.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (Nov. 11,
1993) (emphasis added).
194.
The Refugee Convention can be distinguished from other human rights treaties, in
respect of which only a small number of obligations have clearly been held to restrain expulsion and deportation. See infra Section VB.
195.
The Preamble of the Refugee Convention notes that "it is desirable to revise and
consolidate previous international agreements relating to the status of refugees and to extend
the scope of and the protection accorded by such instruments by means of a new agreement
....
" Refugee Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. A similar point was made recently by the
UNHCR's Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Erika Feller, who noted, "[a]s the purpose of the Convention is to provide its protection to refugees, reference to the rights it sets out to
ensure that such protection is accorded would seem to be the necessary place to start [in defining
'effective protection']." Feller, supra note 5, at 529. She explains, "[a]s to what constitutes such
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Convention does not impose obligations on states to deliver rights to
refugees in the abstract, state parties have assumed obligations to deliver
rights to refugees with whom they have a connection, in some cases
based on mere physical presence. If it were possible to circumvent the
considerable range of obligations imposed on state parties by simply
transferring a refugee
to another state, this would defeat the raison d'etre
• 196
of the Convention. Accordingly, a good faith application of Convention
obligations requires that, in order to transfer a refugee to another state in
accordance with the Refugee Convention, a state is under an obligation
to ensure that the refugee will enjoy the rights to which she is entitled
under the Convention scheme. This includes all Convention rights to
which she is entitled at the time of transfer.' 97 In addition, "[h]e or she
must also acquire in the receiving state such additional rights as are
mandated by the requirements of the Convention.' ' 8
The Michigan Guidelines adopt the view that respect for all Convention rights in the receiving state is required. However, it is important to
consider an alternative position, put forward by Legomsky, which introduces the possibility of differentiating between Refugee Convention
rights (and indeed, other international human rights obligations) in assessing which rights should constrain state behavior. Relying on the
jurisprudence of international bodies such as the Human Rights Committee and the ECHR-in which it is established that substantive
protections such as the right to be free from torture and degrading treatment impose non-refoulement obligations on state parties-together with
Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility, Legomsky developed
the following "complicity principle":
[N]o country may return a refugee or asylum seeker to a third
country knowing that the third country will do anything to that
quality [effective] protection, the Convention regime can certainly be interpreted to require of
States parties that any attempt to ascertain the availability of such protection should be informed by the rights set out in the Convention and Protocol, together with other international
human rights instruments." Id.
196.
This is also distinguishable from general human rights obligations, since the object
and purpose of general human rights treaties is to ensure the protection of rights to all those
within a state party's territory or jurisdiction, rather than only to a specific group such as refugees. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 115, art. 2(1),
197.
In ascertaining which obligations the sending state has incurred with respect to a
particular refugee, reference must be made to the refugee's connection with that state. For
example, once a refugee is on the territory of a state, that state incurs a number of obligations
immediately, including the obligation to respect freedom of religion, access to the courts,
access to education, and freedom from constraints on movement unless shown to be necessary
and justifiable. See supra notes 188-189. On this analysis, in order legitimately to transfer a
refugee to a third state, the sending state would need to ensure that these obligations would be
upheld in that third state.
198.

Michigan Guidelines, supra note 15, 9 8.
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person that the sending country would not have been permitted
to do itself-regardless whether the third country is a party to
the 1951 Convention or to any other human rights conventions.' 99
In ascertaining whether a state has knowingly transferred a person to
a state in which his or her rights will be violated, Legomsky suggests the
possibility of prescribing a "variable standard of proof,"2°° such that
"[t]he more important the particular right, the more confident the [sending] country should have to be before it is permitted to effect a return. 2 °'
Legomsky suggests that this approach may be particularly attractive in
20 2
order to "temper extreme applications of the complicity principle.
Thus, all the rights in the Refugee Convention (and other human rights
treaties) must be respected in the third state in order for a transfer to be
effected, 203 "but since the range of protected fights is so vast," in applying
the complicity principle, the "probability and the seriousness of the violation are appropriately considered. 2 ° In this model, the possible
method of differentiation between fights is introduced by way of a procedural device.0

199.
Legomsky, supra note 12, at 620 (emphasis in original). "[N]o state may knowingly
assist another state to do what international law would forbid the first state from doing on its
own. Otherwise, the first state would be an accomplice to the misdeed committed by the second state." Id. at 619-20.
200.
Id. at 623.
201.
Id.
202.
Id. at 624. Legomsky explains:
To many observers, an unadorned version of the complicity principle will have
logical appeal but pragmatic limitations .... [T]he spectrum of refugee rights under
the 1951 Convention and other human rights agreements is vast. Some of those
rights, all will agree, are fundamental. Others are more minor. One might balk at an
international norm that prohibits return to a third country solely because that country will violate a minor right.
Id. at 624. He also outlines the significant practical concerns with an approach which included
all Convention rights. Id. at 641-42.
203.
As Legomsky notes, either all of the articles are relevant or only some of them are,
but if it is the latter, there is no principled method of deciding which are relevant. Thus, all
rights are relevant, but a variable standard of proof applies. See R (ex parte Ullah) v. Special
Adjudicator, [2004] UKHL 26, 3 Eng. Rep. 785 (Eng.) (illustrating comparable issues in
ECHR and Human Rights Committee jurisprudence).
204.
Legomsky, supra note 12, at 626.
205.
This is in contrast to the approach of the House of Lords in Ullah, in which their
Lordships took the view that while all rights in the European Convention could potentially be
invoked, it is necessary to establish a "flagrant" or "gross" violation when the rights to be
invoked are "qualified rights." See Ullah, [2004] UKHL 26, IN 24-25. This is said to be required because "it is only in such a case-where the right will be completely denied or
nullified in the destination country-that it can be said that removal will breach the treaty
obligations of the signatory state however those obligations might be interpreted or whatever
might be said by or on behalf of the destination state." Id. 1 24 (adopting the decision of the
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The difficulty with this approach is that it begs the question of how
one determines which rights are "fundamental" or "most serious," and
which are only "minor." Legomsky provides some insight into possibilities for making this assessment.2° One approach might be to "assume
that those particular Convention rights which extend to all refugees tend
generally to be the ones that the state parties regarded as the most fundamental; otherwise, they would have been reserved for selected
subcategories of refugees. 2 °7 However, it is not clear that this approach
withstands scrutiny. For example, this category includes fights which
might well be regarded as more "fundamental," such as non-refoulement
(Article 33), as well as those possibly considered less so, such as rights
to movable and immovable property (Article 13).208 Indeed, the Refugee
Convention's drafting history suggests different rationales for omitting
particular "attachment" requirements in relation to the various fights in
this category. In the case of property fights, for example, the drafters
considered but rejected higher levels of attachment "because they wished
to ensure that refugees could claim property rights even in a state party
where they were not physically present (on the same basis as other nonresident aliens).,,2 9 By contrast, the right to elementary education on the
same basis as nationals was not subjected to any attachment requirement
in order to reflect the "'urgent need' for, and compulsory nature of, access by all to the most basic forms of education in line with the formula
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 21 °
Another possible approach Legomsky suggests for ascertaining a hierarchy between Refugee Convention rights is to classify them "according to
whether they are reservable or non-reservable, ' '2' the argument being that
the fact that the drafters consciously distinguished reservable from nonreservable rights "is compelling evidence that the drafters regarded some
Convention rights as more fundamental than others. 2 1' However, as
Legomsky acknowledges, "even some of the reservable rights are keenly
Immigration Appeal Tribunal in Devaseelan v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2003] Imm.
A.R. 1,9[ 111 (Eng.)).
206.
Although it should be noted that this is developed in relation to an alternative to "a
strict application of the complicity principle," such that only fundamental rights would be
subject to the complicity principle, leaving out altogether rights deemed less important. Legomsky, supra note 12, at 643.
207.
Id. at 643.
208.
It is noteworthy that the right to property, while found in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, was not ultimately codified into either the ICCPR or ICESCR.
209.
HATHAWAY, supra note 35, at 162.
210.
Id.
211.
Legomsky, supra note 12, at 644. Article 42.1 of the Convention permits states to
make reservations to some (but not all) articles at the time of signature, ratification, or accession.
212.
Id. at 644.
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important. ' 231 Indeed, rather than reflecting a normative hierarchy, Legomsky notes that allowing for the option of entering reservations may
have been a practical measure to enable states to become parties to the
Refugee Convention immediately, "rather than have to wait until they
had amended any of their laws that conflicted with the Convention., 2' 4 It
may therefore be dangerous to assume that the fact that some rights are
reservable indicates that they are normatively less important.
A third possible method Legomsky suggests is to distinguish between rights according to whether they are derogable or nonderogable.
However, this notion is not relevant to the Refugee Convention, as no
rights therein are specifically made nonderogable or ineligible for suspension even in times of national emergency.2 5 In any event, relying on
derogability216as a measure of normative importance is also fraught with
complexity.

Id. at 645.
213.
214.
Id. As the Human Rights Committee has explained in relation to the ICCPR, "[tihe
possibility of entering reservations may encourage States which consider that they have difficulties in guaranteeing all the rights in the Covenant none the less to accept the generality of
obligations in that instrument. Reservations may serve a useful function to enable States to
adapt specific elements in their laws to the inherent rights of each person as articulated in the
Covenant." U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocolsthereto,
or in Relation to Declarationsunder Article 41 of the Covenant, 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2 1/
Rev. 1/Add.6 (Nov. 11, 1994) [hereinafter General Comment 24].
Rather, Article 9 of the Refugee Convention provides that a state may take provi215.
sional measures "which it considers to be essential to the national security in the case of a
particular person" in "time of war or other grave and exceptional circumstances." Refugee
Convention, supra note 1,art. 9.
Legomsky applies a similar notion of core, or fundamental rights in the context of
216.
other human rights instruments. Although he ultimately concludes that "international law
prohibits a destination country from knowingly returning asylum seekers to a third country
that will violate rights guaranteed by universal or regional human rights agreements to which
the destination country is a party," he suggests that the degree of certainty required by the
word "knowingly" once again "should vary inversely with the importance of the right." Legomsky, supra note 12, at 651-52. Again, the difficulty is in ascertaining the relative
importance of different rights. One possibility Legomsky considers is to assess the importance
of rights by reference to derogability. Since he considers the rights in the ICESCR "more in
the nature of aspirations," he concludes that it is those non-derogable rights in the ICCPR
which would be considered most fundamental. This is said to have a number of advantages,
including that such non-derogable rights are recognized by the world community "as having
particular importance; otherwise they would be derogable." Id. at 649-50. However, the value
of this approach is open to question in light of the Human Rights Committee's cautionary
note:
[N]ot all rights of profound importance, such as articles 9 and 27 of the Covenant,
have in fact been made non-derogable. One reason for certain rights being made
non-derogable is because their suspension is irrelevant to the legitimate control of
the state of national emergency (for example, no imprisonment for debt, in article
11). Another reason is that derogation may indeed be impossible (as, for example,
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Since no principled method has been advanced for distinguishing between different types of obligations under the Refugee Convention, the
Guidelines conclude that any transfer must be preceded by a good faith
empirical assessment that refugees will in practice enjoy the rights set by
Articles 2-34 of the Convention in the receiving state.1 7
The final point to address in this Section is the question of how one
measures or assesses whether the receiving state will in fact deliver Convention protection. It is important here to recognize that Convention
rights are, apart from a few exceptions, generally not framed in absolute
terms; rather, they are required to be implemented at different relative
levels. For example, in some cases a refugee will be entitled to the same
level of protection as nationals, while in other cases a refugee is entitled
only to the level enjoyed by aliens in that state. 8 With respect to rights
that are unqualified, for example non-refoulement (Article 33), nondiscrimination (Article 3), and nonpenalization (Article 31), assessing
whether the third state will comply with these rights is a matter of assessing compliance in absolute terms. 2'9 However, for those rights
defined by reference to another group (aliens, most favored nationals, or
nationals), the sending state must ensure that refugees will be guaranteed
freedom of conscience). At the same time, some provisions are non-derogable exactly because without them there would be no rule of law.
General Comment No. 24, supra note 214, 10. See also U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 29: State of Emergency (Article 4), 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/

Add. I (Aug. 31, 1994) ("However it is apparent that some other provisions of the Covenant
were included in the list of non-derogable provisions because it can never become necessary
to derogate from these rights during a state of emergency (e.g., articles 11 and 18)"). Moreover, although it is certainly true that the obligations in the ICESCR are subject to progressive
realization, and thus allow for considerations such as resource constraints to justify failure to
comply, all rights in the ICESCR are non-derogable. This has been explained on the basis that
derogation of ICESCR rights would not be appropriate or justified even in a public emergency.
MAGDALENA SEPULVEDA, THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL

277-92 (2003). In addition, the
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has begun to define core obligations
with respect to individual rights which are immediately binding, and from which no derogation is permitted. For example, in relation to the right to health, the Committee has set out the
core minimum obligations of State parties pursuant to Article 12 of the ICESCR, emphasizing
that "a State party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance
with the core obligations set out in paragraph 43 above, which are non-derogable."U.N. Econ.
& Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No.
COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standardof Health (Art. 12 of the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 47, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2000/4 (Aug. 11,

2000) (emphasis added). In light of this analysis, it is clear that, at a minimum, the core obligations in the ICESCR would need to be considered in any assessment of which rights are
most fundamental.
217.

218.
219.

Michigan Guidelines, supra note 15, 3.
HATHAWAY,supra note 35, at 228-37.

Note, however, the logistical difficulties raised by Legomsky, supra note 12.
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rights in the receiving state by reference to the rights enjoyed by others
in the receiving state.
B. Respect for Other InternationalHuman Rights Obligations

Most state parties to the Refugee Convention are also parties to other
major international human rights treaties, and are thus also220constrained
by non-refoulement
principles
derived fom
from such
treati . Such nonby on-efolemnt
rinipls drivd
uchtreaties
refoulement obligations prevent a state from sending a person to any
other state in which the person will face a violation of at least some of
the rights protected in the relevant treaty. International humanitarian law
may also constrain a state's ability to remove or transfer a refugee pursuant to a protection elsewhere scheme; 22' however, the focus in this Part is
on international human rights law, given that its applicability to removals

220.
Compare Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights (OCHR), http://
www.ohchr.org/english/countrles/ratification/4.htm4 (list of countries participating in the
ICCPR), and OCHR, http://www.ochr.org/English/counties/ratification/3.htm (list of countries participating in the ICESCR), with UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/
treaty2ref.htm (list of countries participating the Refugee Convention). Only twelve state
parties to the Refugee Convention have not also acceded to the ICCPR, and of those twelve,
four have at least signed the ICCPR. Similarly, there are 152 state parties to the ICESCR.
Only fifteen state parties to the Refugee Convention have not also acceded to the ICESCR,
and of those fifteen, five had at least signed the ICESCR (Belize, Kazakhstan, Sao Tome and
Principe, South Africa, and the United States).
221.
For example, in Orelien, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal accepted that to
return the applicants in that case to Haiti "would violate Canada's obligations under the Fourth
Geneva Convention, the Second Protocol and a customary norm of international law prohibiting the forcible repatriation of foreign nationals who have fled generalized violence and other
threats to their lives and security arising out of internal armed conflict within their state of
nationality." Orelien v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 592,
608. As to customary international law, others have argued that there now exists a norm which
"prohibits a state from forcibly repatriating foreign nationals who find themselves in its territory after having fled generalized violence and other threats to their lives and security caused
by internal armed conflict within their own state." Deborah Perluss & Joan F. Harman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 551, 554 (1986). See also
Charles W. Cookson II, In Re Santos: Extending the Right of Non-Return to Refugees of Civil
Wars, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 145, 146 (1991). The European Union Minimum Standards Directive applies its regime of subsidiary protection to situations where there is a
"serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence
in situations of international or internal armed conflict." Council Directive 2004/83/EC,
Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals and Stateless
Persons as Refugees or as Persons who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, art. 15(c), 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (EC). Jane McAdam explains
that this provision "reflects the existence of consistent, albeit varied, State practice of granting
some form of complementary protection to persons fleeing the indiscriminate effects of armed
conflict or generalized violence without a specific link to Convention grounds." Jane
McAdam, The European Union QualificationDirective: The Creation of a Subsidiary Protection Regime, 17 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 461,479-80 (2005).
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of persons from territory is very well established, and it is also most pertinent to transfers under protection elsewhere policies.
In some cases, the relevant non-refoulement obligation is explicitly
outlined in the treaty; for example, Article 3 of the Convention against
Torture provides that "[n]o State Party shall expel, return ('refouler') or
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds
for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 223
In other treaties, the non-refoulement obligation has been implied from
the obligation to protect specific rights. For example, the Human Rights
Committee has outlined in a number of decisions the basis for an "implied non-refoulement" doctrine in the ICCPR. Most recently, it noted in
General Comment 31 on the Nature of General Obligations:
Moreover, the article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties
respect and ensure the Covenant rights for all persons in their
territory and all persons under their control entails an obligation
not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from
their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing
that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, either in the country
to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the
person may subsequently be removed. 2 4
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has similarly explained:
Furthermore, in fulfilling obligations under the Convention,
States shall not return a child to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of
irreparable harm to the child, such as, but by no means limited
to, those contemplated under articles 6 and 37 of the Convention, either in the country to which removal is to be effected or
in any country to which the child may subsequently be removed.
Such non-refoulement obligations apply irrespective of whether
serious violations of those rights guaranteed under the Convention originate from non-State actors or whether such violations
are directly intended or are the indirect consequence of action or
inaction. The assessment of the risk of such serious violations
should be conducted in an age and gender-sensitive manner and
should, for example, take into account the particularly serious
222.
This is because it is much more likely that a state will attempt to transfer a refugee
under a protection elsewhere scheme to a state in which there are concerns as to compliance
with the general international human rights instruments than a state in which an armed conflict
exists.
223.
Convention against Torture, supra note 78, art. 3.
224.
General Comment No. 31, supra note 145, 12.
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consequences for children of the insufficient provision of food
225
or health services .
This general principle finds support in similar developments with regional
human rights treaties, most importantly the European Convention.2 6
While the general principle is not open to question, the more complex and less settled question is whether this constraint operates with
respect to all or only a subset of treaty rights. On the one hand, the manner in which the principle is framed in some HRC jurisprudence
suggests the possibility that the principle may apply to all rights. For
example, in Ng v. Canada, the HRC held that "[i]f a State party extradites a person within its jurisdiction in such circumstances, and if, as a
result, there is a real risk that his or her rights under the Covenant will

be violated in another jurisdiction, the State party may itself be in violation of the Covenant.'22 7 The unqualified manner in which this principle
is stated could support an argument that it applies to all rights in the
ICCPR (and other relevant treaties).2 Similarly, the Committee on the
Rights of the Child explicitly stated in the above General Comment that
the analysis is "by no means limited to" the specific articles mentioned.
On the other hand, the reference to a "real risk of irreparable harm"
and the mention of specific articles in the General Comments (although
not listed exhaustively)
•
229may suggest this analysis is applicable only in
Notwithstanding the continuing uncertainty
limited circumstances.
225.
Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6: Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside Their Country of Origin, 27, U.N. Doc. CRC/
GC/2005/6 (Sept. 1, 2005).
226.
See supra note 139.
U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 469/1991: Ng v. Canada, 14.2, U.N.
227.
Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (Nov. 5, 1993) (emphasis added). See also U.N. Human Rights
Comm., Commc'n No. 470/1991: Kindler v. Canada, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991
(July 30, 1993).
Indeed, in R (ex parte Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator, Lord Bingham of Cornhill
228.
interpreted the Human Rights Committee jurisprudence on point in a similar way-as potentially applying to all rights protected in the ICCPR. [2004] UKHL 26, 23, 3 Eng. Rep. 785
(U.K.). Ruma Mandal notes that the Human Rights Committee has "hinted that uncertainty
about the permanency of residence of foreign husbands, and thus the risk of their deportation,
could constitute a violation of the Covenant's provision on right to family life." U.N. High
Comm'r for Refugees, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, Protection Mechanisms
Outside of the 1951 Convention ("Complementary Protection"), 1 59, U.N. Doc. PPLA/
2005/02 (June 2005) (prepared by Ruma Mandal) (citing U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Commc'n No. R.9/35: Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) at
134 (Apr. 9, 1981)).
229.
The ECHR has not definitively stated whether the "implied non-refoulement" principle is capable of applying to all or only a subset of Convention rights. The ECHR has most
often relied on Article 3 in such cases, declining to adjudicate other articles in this context on
the basis that it is unnecessary where an Article 3 claim is successful. However, the ECHR has
made reference to the possibility that other articles may be engaged in this context. For a
summary of the relevant ECHR jurisprudence, see Ullah, [2004] UKHL 26, $19-20.In Ullah,
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about the true scope of the implied non-refoulement principle, we can at
least conclude definitively that state parties to the key international human rights treaties must, at a minimum, take into account the risk of
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment,230 violations of the
right to life, and, in the case of children, liberty, 3 in any third state to
which it proposes to transfer refugees.
VI. SAFEGUARDS

The final Part of this Article sets out important procedural guarantees pertaining to the circumstances in which a sending state may
transfer a refugee to a third state. While some references have been made
above to the need for a state contemplating a protection elsewhere transfer to ensure that procedural guarantees are in place in the receiving
state,232 this Part considers those procedural safeguards in detail.
A. The Needfor an EmpiricalAssessment and the
Ability to Challenge a Decision to Transfer

Some protection elsewhere schemes instituted or proposed to date
have not required an assessment of the particular circumstances of individual refugees; rather, transfers have been made based on blanket
determinations that a third country is "safe" for all refugees . 2 The question is whether this determination is satisfactory or whether a state must
engage in individual assessments. A related question is whether an indithe House of Lords concluded that the principle potentially applies to all rights in the European Convention. The House of Lords surveyed the existing jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights, noting that articles other than Article 3 have been contemplated by
that Court as possibly relevant to the non-refoulement analysis. Accordingly, the House of
Lords held that the Court of Appeal's ruling that, "except for Article 3, articles of the European Convention can never be engaged in immigration decisions to expel an alien was wrong."
Id. 49 (Lord Steyn). As Lord Steyn noted, while many of the rights contained in the European Convention are "qualified guarantees," "subject to derogation," they are nonetheless "of
great importance," such that to reject the possibility of such rights being engaged in the context of return would result in "an impoverished view of the role of a human rights convention."
Ullah, [2004] UKHL 26,
42-43. See also Noll, supra note 129, at 568 (arguing that nonrefoulement applies to all rights).
230.
See Convention against Torture, supra note 78, art. 3; ICCPR, supra note 115, art.
6; CRC, supra note 147, art. 37.
231.
CRC, supra note 147, art. 37.
232.
See supra notes 106-114 and accompanying text.
233.
For example, Article 36 of Council Directive 2005/85, Minimum Standards on
Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status, 2005 O.J. (L
326) 13 (EC), allows refugees "to be sent with no risk assessment whatever to states that are
bound by both the Refugee Convention and the European Convention on human rights, which
are adjudged to observe their provisions, and which operate a formal asylum procedure."
HATHAWAY, supra note 35, at 295.
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vidual refugee should be afforded the ability to challenge a decision to
transfer him to another country, including the right to appeal such decision.
It is not sufficient to declare that a certain country or region is automatically "safe" or that it will necessarily provide Convention protection
to all refugees. Even in the context of a regionalized formal arrangement
wherein it is assumed that all member states provide comparable protection, such as that embodied in the Dublin scheme, domestic courts have
prevented transfers based on a finding that a particular refugee's rights
will not be protected in another state.3 This highlights the importance of
a state's inquiry into particular circumstances vis-A-vis individual refugees, which involves allowing individual refugees the opportunity to
present evidence that may indicate specific concerns about the availability of protection in a third country.235 As Legomsky observes, since the
potential consequences of an incorrect decision in this context are as
drastic as in the determination of the substance of a refugee claim, the
same safeguards should be available in both contexts.236 Further, Legomsky notes that these safeguards are required as a practical matter since, in
each of these settings, "questions of empirical fact, predictions, characterizations of predicted events and legal interpretation issues can all arise and
can all prove difficult. 2 37 Situations involving refugee claims by children
highlight the importance of this principle. A recent review of the Dublin II
Regulation has revealed that in some cases children have been transferred under that scheme to other member states "before an age
assessment has been carried out to verify whether or not they are children ',238 which is a vital question in assessing the likelihood that an
applicant's rights will be respected in the receiving state. Accordingly,
the Michigan Guidelines adopt the view of the House of Lords that a
234.
See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
For example, concerns have been expressed about the ability of women refugees to
235.
obtain protection in the United States under the U.S.-Canada Agreement. See Akibo-Betts,
supra note 88; Macklin, supra note 88. Further, the Dublin experience makes it clear that an
agreement is not sufficient; rather, a refugee must be able to argue that in his individual case a
transfer should not be permitted. This is clear from the case law to date, in which a number of
courts have found that refugees cannot be transferred to other member states under the Dublin
II Regulation. For example, ECRE explains that in 2002, the Austrian Independent Asylum
Review Board "ruled that an applicant could not be transferred to Italy according to the Dublin Convention on the grounds that Italy was not deemed safe for Turkish Kurds because there
would be a danger of chain refoulement to Turkey." ECRE DUBLIN II, supra note 4, at 14
(internal citation omitted).
Legomsky, supra note 12, at 670. See generally Reinhard Marx, Non-refoulement,
236.
Access to Procedures,and Responsibilityfor Determining Refugee Claims, 7 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 383,404-45 (1995).
Legomsky, supra note 12, at 670.
237.
ECRE DUBLIN II, supra note 4, at 157.
238.
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state is under a duty "to inform [itself] of the facts and monitor the decisions made by a third country in order to satisfy [itself] that the third
country will not send the applicant to another country otherwise than in
accordance with the convention. 2

9

The sending state must also ensure

that an applicant's Convention rights, in addition to Article 33, will be
respected in the destination country.
In light of these factors, questions arise regarding the acceptability
of an expedited or summary procedure, in which procedural safeguards
are compromised in order to achieve efficiency. The House of Lords
considered this issue in the Yogathas case, in which Lord Hutton noted
the
tension between the need to make use of an accelerated procedure to enable the arrangements under the Dublin Convention to
operate effectively and the duty to recognize the human rights of
a person who, once he is in the United Kingdom, is entitled to
the protection given by [relevant human rights guarantees]. '°
However, such concerns regarding efficiency were held not to obviate
the need for the court to subject the decision to transfer a refugee "to a
rigorous examination. '4 ' Where an accelerated procedure is employed
in making transfer decisions under a protection elsewhere scheme, fundamental procedural guarantees, such as due process, procedural
fairness (including the right to hear the evidence to be relied upon in an
adverse decision 4 2 ), and the right to legal counsel, 243 must be
239.
R (ex parte Yogathas) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dept, [2002] UKHL 36, 9, 4
Eng. Rep. 800 (Eng.) (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). This is also the approach in the Australian
case law, despite its representing one of the least protective approaches to "safe third countries." See, e.g., Al Toubi v. MIMA (2001) F.C.A. 1381, 1 32.
240.
Yogathas, [2002] UKHL 36, 74. Note also language in the opinions of Lord
Hutton, id. 72 ("[T]he European Court on occasion considers a case in considerable detail
before holding that the applicant's complaint is manifestly ill founded ....
"),Lord Bingham
of Cornhill, id. 14 ("[T]he Home Secretary must carefully consider the allegation, the
grounds on which it is made and any material relied on to support it."), and Lord Hope of
Craighead, id. 58 (balancing the use of accelerated removal procedures with refugee protections under the Geneva Conventions and the ECHR "places a special responsibility on the
court in its examination of the decision making process ....[T]he basis of the decision must
surely call for the most anxious scrutiny").
241.
Id. 174.
242.
In the United Kingdom, it "is incumbent on an adjudicator to make available to the
parties any evidence as to the safety of the third country upon which he relies in his determination." SYMES & JORRO, supra note 8, at 539, citing Gnavavarathan v. A Special Adjudicator,
[1995] Imm. A.R. 64 (A.C.), and R (exparte Kamalraj) v. A Special Adjudicator, [1995] Imm.
A.R. 288 (Q.B.).
243.
In R (L) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (2003) EWCA (Civ) 25 (A.C.), the
U.K. Court of Appeal emphasized that a preliminary hearing to assess whether a country is
safe must be fair and include access to legal counsel. Id.
30, 38 (cited in HATHAWAY, supra
note 35, at 334). Further, the procedure must give "careful consideration to the facts of the
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respected. 2" International standards for procedural fairness must be
complied with, particularly Article 14 of the ICCPR, which provides that
in the determination of "rights and obligations in a suit at law," "everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing' 24by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Another important issue that arises in this context is which partythe individual refugee or the sending state--carries the burden of establishing whether a third state is able to deliver the requisite protection.
The UNHCR has made it clear that, since the country in which a person
seeks refugee protection has the primary responsibility for considering
the claim, that country has the burden of proving that it would be safe to
transfer responsibility to a third country.246 Indeed, as established above,
once a refugee is within a state's jurisdiction or territory, the state incurs
obligations as a matter of international law. Since the state retains ultimate responsibility for any action in violation of such obligations, the
47
onus rests on the state to ensure such violations do not occur. It is arguable that this is also required for practical reasons, since a refugee
cannot be expected to have access to relevant information to establish
that a third country, to which she may never have been, is incapable of
providing Convention protection. As noted by the European Council on
Refugees and Exiles, a refugee cannot "be expected to know how to access the protection system, be familiar with relevant national and
legal standards, or be familiar with the language of the third
international
' 28
country.
It is possible to argue that cessation determinations provide analogous guidance, since they involve a similar question of whether
protection continues to be necessary in a particular case. In that context,

individual case." L v. Sec'y of State, EWCA (Civ) 25, 9145. See generally HATHAWAY, supra
note 35, at 333-35.
Michigan Guidelines,supra note 15, 12.
244.
ICCPR, supra note 115, art. 14.
245.
U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Observations on the European Commission's
246.
proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status, 9136, available at http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/
43662adf0.pdf.
247.
A similar argument is made in EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES,
GUARDING REFUGEE PROTECTION STANDARDS

IN REGIONS OF ORIGIN

29 (2005), available at

However, a
http://www.ecre.org/publications/ECRE%20WF%20protreg-Dec%202005.pdf.
contrary position was taken by the House of Lords in Yogathas, in which Lord Hutton noted
that "[tihe onus rests on the person alleging that his removal from the United Kingdom would
constitute a breach of Article 3 by the United Kingdom to show substantial grounds for believing that he would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3." R (ex
parteYogathas) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dept, [2002] UKHL 36, 61, 4 Eng. Rep. 800.
248.
EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES, supra note 247, at 29.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 28:223

courts have emphasized that the state has "an evidential burden ... to
establish that the [refugee] could safely be returned home. 249
Legomsky has suggested, alternatively, that it may be permissible for
the sending country to "shift to the applicant the burden of identifying
any particular Convention provisions that he or she believes the third
country will violate, as well as the burden of producing some evidence
of the prospective violations." 50 However, once these burdens are satisfied, the sending state would retain "the ultimate burden of proving that
the third country will not violate those provisions.! 25' It is important to
underline the fact that any such procedural device cannot remove the
sending state's ultimate responsibility under international law to ensure
that any transfer is undertaken in accordance with its obligations under
both the Refugee Convention and other international human rights instruments.
The second procedural requirement is closely related to the first: not
only are adequate first instance procedures critical, but they must also
include sufficient opportunity for review or appeal. Since the onus remains on the state to ensure that it does not violate its international
obligations by transferring refugees to a third state, the state must also
provide for an opportunity for a refugee to contest the validity of a transfer decision.2 2 This is particularly important where the initial decision
was made by a government official, in order to ensure that a refugee's
rights will be determined by an "independent and impartial tribunal established by law.' 253 The potentially serious consequences of returning or
sending a refugee to a country in which she may be subjected to indirect

249.
R (ex parte Hoxha) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2005] UKHL. 19, 66, 4
Eng. Rep. 580 (U.K.) (Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood). See also U.N. High Comm'r
for Refugees, Guidelines on InternationalProtection: Cessation of Refugee Status under Article IC(5) and 6 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/
GIP/03/03 (Feb. 10, 2003) ("The burden rests on the country of asylum to demonstrate that
there has been a fundamental, stable and durable change in the country of origin and that invocation of art. I C(5) or (6) is appropriate.").
250.
Legomsky, supra note 12, at 674.
251.
Id.
252.
A similar analysis was adopted by the Austrian Constitutional Court in a 2004 decision holding that the "complete exclusion of suspensive effect" of transfer decisions pending
appeal was in conflict with the Austrian Constitution. In that case, the Court "referred to the
ECHR admissibility decision T. v UK, which confirmed that the state deciding that another
Dublin state is competent remains responsible for guaranteeing that Art[icle] 3 ECHR is not
violated." ECRE DUBLIN II, supra note 4, at 15 (internal citation omitted). See also UNHCR
DUBLIN II, supra note 7, at 50 ("[T]he applicants should nonetheless be given access to an
appeal or review procedure" in order to "avoid possible serious consequences of incorrect first
instance decisions.").
253.
ICCPR, supra note 115, art. 14.
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refoulement underscores the need for this procedure. For this reason,
the Michigan Guidelines conclude that determination procedures should
afford an effective remedy "bearing in mind the nature of the rights alleged to be at risk in the receiving state. 255
A recent UNHCR paper assessing the Dublin II Regulation has highlighted the difficulties that arise when a state does not allow for
suspension of an order to transfer pending appeal, when the decision to
transfer is overturned on appeal. 2 6 It concludes that in order for a remedy
to be effective, "it must be possible for an applicant to request suspensive effect" pending any appeal or review of a decision to transfer.257
B. The Need for Transfer to be Undertaken
Pursuant to a Written Agreement
Some of the key concerns about the implementation of protection
elsewhere policies relate to the lack of any formal arrangement between
sending and receiving states,258 the fact that transfers are made to states
that are not parties to the Refugee Convention, and the fact that no facility to supervise and monitor the treatment of transferred refugees may be
in place in the receiving state. In light of the threat to refugee rights inherent in such schemes and the exceptional nature of protection elsewhere
policies, the Michigan Guidelines recommend that transfer under a protection elsewhere policy should only take place pursuant to a written
agreement between the states in question. 25' At a minimum, such an
agreement should stipulate the duty of the receiving state to respect the
refugee status of persons defined by Article 1 of the Convention; provide
transferred refugees the rights in Articles 2-34 of the Convention; ensure
The UNHCR empahsizes this point in its review of the Dublin II regulation: "[t]he
254.
right to an effective remedy is indeed important, as Dublin II decisions may have serious consequences for the outcome of a person's asylum claim, in view of the continued divergence in
the asylum practice of the participating States." UNHCR DUBLIN II, supra note 7, at 20.
Michigan Guidelines,supra note 15, 12.
255.
UNHCR DUBLIN II, supra note 7, at 19-20. The UNHCR explains that in one case,
256.
the refugee was required to pay the costs of transfer back to the sending state (Austria, from
Poland).
257.
Id. at 20. ECRE makes a similar argument, noting that without automatic suspensive effect of transfer decisions, "the effect of an appeal is rendered meaningless" ECRE
DUBLIN II, supra note 4, at 166. See also Legomsky, supra note 12, at 672 (arguing that a state
must ensure that a transfer decision is not implemented "until the entire determination process,
including appeal, has been completed").
This is particularly the case in the unilateral transfers effected by Australia, espe258.
cially where a refugee has no legal right to be admitted to the transferred state. See
HATHAWAY, supra note 35, at 331.
In this regard, UNHCR's Model Co-operation Agreement provides a useful tem259.
plate for the "establishment and operation of a representative presence in the territory of
states." MARJOLEINE ZIECK, UNHCR's WORLDWIDE PRESENCE IN THE FIELD: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF

UNHCR's COOPERATION

AGREEMENTS

5 (2006).
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the right and ability of transferred refugees to notify UNHCR of any alleged breach of the responsibilities of the receiving state; grant UNHCR
the right to be present in the receiving state and to enjoy unhindered access to transferred refugees in order to monitor compliance with the
receiving state's responsibilities towards them; 260 and "abide by a procedure (whether established by the agreement or otherwise) for the
settlement of any disagreement arising out of interpretation or implementation of the agreement., 26' This would constitute a "best practice"
implementation of a protection elsewhere policy.
C. Obligation to Undertake Post-TransferMonitoring
Whether a transfer is undertaken pursuant to a written agreement, as
recommended above, or simply according to an informal arrangement
between the sending and receiving states, the obligation of the sending
state does not end once a refugee has been transferred. Rather, a sending
state remains under an obligation to monitor, on an ongoing basis, the
extent to which the receiving state respects the requirements of Articles
1-34 of the Refugee Convention in its treatment of transferred refugees.
It is not sufficient for a state to rely on formal or informal assurances
regarding the receiving state's intention to uphold its international obligations pursuant to the Refugee Convention, human rights treaties, or
formal agreements. Rather, where the sending state intends to continue
to transfer refugees to the third state, it must undertake a good faith empirical assessment of whether rights are being respected in the receiving
state.
The Human Rights Committee takes a similar view of the implied
non-refoulementprovisions inthe ICCPR.As it has explained:
When a State party expels a person to another State on the basis
of assurances as to that person's treatment by the receiving State,
it must institute credible mechanisms for ensuring compliance
by the receiving State with these assurances from the moment of
expulsion.262
This is vital because where a sending state has actual or constructive
knowledge of significant violations of Articles 1-34 of the Refugee
Convention by the receiving state,"' it can no longer in good faith assert
260.
See ZIECK, supra note 259, at 337 (citing Article Il,
4 of the Model Co-operation
Agreement).
261.
Michigan Guidelines, supra note 15, T 16.
262.
U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Sweden, 79(12)(b), U.N.
Doc. A/57/40, 57, vol. I (2002), cited in HATHAWAY, supra note 35, at 333 n.249.
263.
It must be acknowledged that very minor violations of Convention rights will not
necessarily disentitle a state from relying on a transfer agreement.
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that transfers can be made in accordance with the Convention. In such a
case, the sending state is "disentitled from effecting any further transfers
to that state under a protection elsewhere policy unless and until there is
clear evidence that the breach has ceased. ' 26
Where a state transfers a refugee pursuant to a protection elsewhere
arrangement in good faith (with no actual or constructive knowledge that
the third state will not respect the refugee's rights), and the third state in
fact violates the refugee's rights, the sending state is not under a legal
obligation to receive such refugees back into its territory and give them
Convention protection.26 ' At most one might argue that a refugee who
has not been afforded protection in a state to which she has been transferred has a legitimate expectation that the original state in which she
sought protection will readmit her and deliver the Convention rights to
which she is entitled.266 However, notwithstanding the fact that there is
no strict legal obligation to do so, the sending state should consider facilitating "the return and readmission of the refugee in question to its
territory, and ensure respect
for her rights there in line with the require267
ments of the Convention.
VII. CONCLUSION
In recent years, many state parties to the Refugee Convention have
instituted a variety of schemes to assign protective responsibility over
refugees to other states. These schemes, while potentially offering opportunities for the genuine and fair allocation of protection
responsibility, have in practice raised serious concerns regarding respect
for refugee rights. Against this background, this Article considered the
legality of protection elsewhere schemes, focusing in particular on the
constraints imposed on such schemes by the Refugee Convention.

264.
Michigan Guidelines, supra note 15, 1 15.
265.
The sending state may, however, seek reparation from the receiving state where the
receiving state has violated an agreement and therefore committed an internationally wrongful
act. In this regard it should be noted that the notion of "injury" is not confined to material
damage. See, e.g., Rainbow Warrior (N.Z. v. Fr.), 20 R.I.A.A. 217, 267 (1990), cited in CRAWFORD, supra note 161, at 203 (holding that France had "provoked indignation and public
outrage in New Zealand and caused a new, additional non-material damage ... of a moral,
political and legal nature, resulting from the affront to the dignity and prestige not only of
New Zealand as such, but of its highest judicial and executive authorities as well"). This type
of damage could well be relevant in the context of transfer agreements, although it does little
to benefit refugees directly.
266.
This argument could possibly be made in domestic law systems, such as the United
Kingdom and Australia.
267.
Michigan Guidelines, supra note 15, 1 14.
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An analysis of the text of the Convention revealed that protection
elsewhere schemes are not prohibited by the Refugee Convention.
Accordingly, it is possible for a state, in compliance with its Convention
obligations, to assign protective responsibility over a refugee within its
territory or jurisdiction to another state. However, as set out in this
Article and the accompanying Michigan Guidelines, the circumstances
in which a state may lawfully assign responsibility to another state are
closely circumscribed by the obligations set out in the Refugee
Convention. Most importantly, a state contemplating a transfer pursuant
to a protection elsewhere policy must ensure that the state to which the
refugee will be transferred will in fact respect the rights set by Articles
2-34 of the Refugee Convention. Further, in assessing this question, a
sending state must allow a refugee the opportunity to contest the legality
of the proposed transfer before it is effected.
The Convention therefore imposes significant restrictions on the
ability of states to effect protection elsewhere policies. Indeed, given the
stringent requirements of international law, it is likely that protection
elsewhere schemes can be lawfully implemented only in very exceptional circumstances. The analysis in this Article suggests that many of
the protection elsewhere schemes currently in operation do not comply
with international law. It is imperative that states therefore revise existing policies and practices in order fully to uphold their obligations under
the Refugee Convention.

